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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230612T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230612T110000
DTSTAMP:20230508T101413Z
CREATED:20221025T081119Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230508T101413Z
UID:10017821-1686562200-1686567600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Obligationes
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-3/2023-06-12/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230612T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230612T170000
DTSTAMP:20230608T114754Z
CREATED:20230608T114753Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230608T114754Z
UID:10017836-1686582000-1686589200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Viviane Fairbank (University of St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism about Logical Inference \nIs there a special relationship between logic and reasoning? Some people think there is in virtue of the fact that reasoners often perform so-called logical inferences—i.e\, deductive inferences that are somehow governed by logical principles. How to make sense of inferences of this kind\, however\, is not so clear. In this talk\, I focus on one puzzle regarding logical inference\, known as the Adoption Problem. The Adoption Problem says that if someone does not already use certain fundamental logical principles in their reasoning\, then they cannot rationally begin to do so\, because beginning to use these principles requires that one already be using them; hence\, the adoption of these principles by any individual is either unnecessary or impossible. This is meant to be a problem for anyone who thinks that logical-inferential habits are subject to rational evaluation and revision. After reconstructing the argument for the Adoption Problem and providing an overview of recent responses in the literature\, I show that the puzzle is in fact a useful tool for making explicit different philosophers’ views on logical inference\, which are usually left implicit. I propose a classification of different responses to the Adoption Problem as either cognitivist or non-cognitivist about logical inference. This classification\, I argue\, allows us to understand the fundamental issues surrounding the nature of logical inference more clearly. In the final section of the talk\, I present an argument against cognitivism about logical inference—and inference more generally—and I suggest that a species of rationalist non-cognitivism about Iogical inference is likely the most fruitful view to pursue.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-4-10/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230613T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230613T140000
DTSTAMP:20230612T095043Z
CREATED:20230612T095020Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230612T095043Z
UID:10018048-1686657600-1686664800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Natalia Waights Hickman (Oxford) Semantic normativity and illusions of sense
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-4-9/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230614T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230614T180000
DTSTAMP:20230612T101244Z
CREATED:20230612T100503Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230612T101244Z
UID:10018620-1686758400-1686765600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory: Lynne Tirrell (Connecticut) Not a Conversation: Hit-and-Run Speech Acts
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: A random stranger approaches you as you wait for a train\, and makes a comment about your body or attire\, and walks away. Call this a hit-and-run encounter. Such encounters are common on social media like Twitter\, with its open platform\, searchable hashtags\, and potential for lurking\, mobbing\, and flooding. Online hit-and-run speech is all about impact without speaker responsibility. On most accounts of language (Austin\, Brandom\, Grice\, Lewis\, others)\, speakers undertake responsibility when they speak\, but hit-and-run online speech tends to evade such responsibilities. Anonymity makes such evasion easy\, but the rapid pace of most social media platforms\, the sheer speed of transmission\, combined with the flood of transmissions\, creates challenges for holding speakers to account for their utterances. This paper addresses questions of responsibility for speech online\, with an emphasis on hit-and-run cases\, contrasting them with non-anonymous chat spaces that are more like IRL conversations. Tracking speaker and hearer responsibilities in these different contexts will offer insights about the fraught issue of online counter-speech.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosphy-and-social-theory-2-8/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230615T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230615T120000
DTSTAMP:20230111T164225Z
CREATED:20230111T164225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230111T164225Z
UID:10018299-1686823200-1686830400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SS Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/ss-seminar/2023-06-15/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230615T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230615T143000
DTSTAMP:20230613T064214Z
CREATED:20230403T104420Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230613T064214Z
UID:10018595-1686834000-1686839400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern/St Andrews) "Some initial reflections on epistemology’s Road Sign Problem"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract:  \nIn this paper I present a problem for a certain very traditional conception of epistemology.   According to this traditional conception\, the epistemic status of one’s doxastic state – belief\, disbelief\, agnosticism – is determined by factors that are limited to (i) one’s current evidence/corpus of beliefs and/or (ii) one’s currently available cognitive processes (together with their reliability score).  I argue that any epistemology that embraces this conception faces what I call the “road sign problem.”   This problem arises when we recognize the possibility that what a road sign enjoins us to do – for example\, (in the US) refrain from turning right on red – is something regarding which we might have all sorts of relevant evidence.  The difficulty is that even if we have overwhelming evidence that p (e.g. that there is no car coming now)\, acting on the assumption that p would not excuse us if\, having violated the road sign’s injunction\, we were to cause an accident.  This is so even if the assumption that p is overwhelmingly supported by our total evidence (and by any information we might acquire by relying at the moment on our available cognitive processes).  I hope to use this example to provide yet more evidence that sometimes the epistemic evaluation of a person’s doxastic state appeals to things that we properly expect them to have done (whether or not they did them) – that is\, by appeal to things that go beyond (i) and (ii).
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar-sanford-goldberg-northwestern-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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