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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230605T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230605T110000
DTSTAMP:20230508T101413Z
CREATED:20221025T081119Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230508T101413Z
UID:10017820-1685957400-1685962800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Obligationes
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-3/2023-06-05/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230605T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230605T170000
DTSTAMP:20230531T144847Z
CREATED:20230531T144847Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230531T144847Z
UID:10017835-1685977200-1685984400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Frederik Andersen (University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Burning Bridges? Rationality’s Fixpoint and Disagreements about Logic  \nAbstract: This draft has two main components. First\, it clarifies and discusses Michael G. Titelbaum’s controversial Fixed Point Thesis\, which is a theme in several debates of contemporary epistemology including the debates on peer disagreement\, epistemic akrasia\, and higher-order evidence. Second\, it relates the initial discussion of Titelbaum’s thesis to the topic of Logical Disagreement in general and disagreements concerning bridge principles in particular. Eventually it’s argued that the epistemological repercussions of accepting the Fixed Point Thesis are so severe that the thesis must be rejected even if this means that states of epistemic akrasia can sometimes be rational
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-4-9/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230606
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230608
DTSTAMP:20231103T112657Z
CREATED:20220729T084928Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231103T112657Z
UID:10017803-1686042000-1686128399@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Lies without Assertions Workshop
DESCRIPTION:Lying requires that a person makes a statement\, but does it require assertion? This last thesis has been recently challenged. It has been argued that speakers can lie with presuppositions (Viebahn 2019)\, promises (Marsili 2016)\, and arguments (Sorensen 2017). Questioning the relation between lies and assertion raises further questions: should we capture in one theoretical category all and only cases we pre-theoretically call ‘lies’? How should we draw the distinction between lying and other kinds of deception such as misleading? What can the nature of lying tell us about the relation between assertion and other speech acts? \nIf you wish to attend (either in person or online)\, please register by sending an email at vt27@st-andrews.ac.uk. \n(Abstracts and Schedule below.) \nThe workshop will be held in the Arts Building\, Room 115 \nSpeakers:\n• Roy Sorensen (University of Texas at Austin/University of St Andrews)\n• Andreas Stokke (Uppsala University)\n• Jessica Pepp (Uppsala University)\n• Neri Marsili (University of Barcelona)\n• Emanuel Viebahn (Humboldt-Universität/Freie Universität\, Berlin) \n \nSchedule \n9.00-9.15 – Welcome & Coffee\n9.15-10.30 – Roy Sorensen (UT Austin / St Andrews) – “Fichte’s World of Wordless Lies”\n10.30-10.45 – Break\n10.45-12.00 – Jessica Pepp (Uppsala Universitet) – “Commitments and Lies\, With or Without Assertion”\n12.00-12.15 – Break\n12.15-13.30 – Emanuel Viebahn (Freie Universität Berlin) – “Telling stories\, telling lies”\n13.30-15.00 – Lunch\n15.00-16.15 – Neri Marsili (UNED Madrid) – “Lying: some insights from speech act theory”\n16.15-16.30 – Break\n16.30-17.45 – Andreas Stokke (Uppsala Universitet) – “Speaking for Someone Else: Group Lies and Self-Less Assertions”\n__________\n\nCommitments and Lies\, With or Without Assertion – Jessica Pepp \nLying and assertion seem to be closely connected. Many philosophers have agreed (details aside) that to lie is to assert something one takes to be false (or\, at least\, not true). What\, then\, to make of cases in which someone seems to lie without asserting anything they believe to be false/untrue? For instance\, what should one say about cases in which people seem to lie about something by presupposing it\, or by implying it? Three options are immediately on the table\, for any given case of putative lying without assertion: (i) reject the judgment that it is a case of lying (perhaps arguing that it is instead a case of misleading)\, (ii) reject the judgment that the content of the lie is not asserted\, (iii) revise the definition of lying so as not to require the content of a lie to be asserted. A fourth option is to accept the judgment that the case is a case of lying and to become (somewhat) quiet about assertion. One can then define lying without appealing to the notion of assertion\, by incorporating elements from accounts of assertion in such a way that the putatively non-assertive lie falls under the definition. If the resultant definition of lying proves robust\, it is then a further question what this should tell us about the nature of assertion. \nThe paper-in-progress on which this talk is based is a collaboration between one author who has pursued the fourth strategy just mentioned\, drawing on so-called “commitment accounts” of assertion (Viebahn 2021) and one author who is favourable to the strategy but critical of the specifics of Viebahn’s approach (Pepp 2022). We aim to pursue the strategy further by addressing two related questions. First\, what is the nature of the commitment that partly constitutes lying and sets it apart from misleading—what does it mean\, in this context\, to commit oneself to something’s being the case? Second\, what are the grounds of that commitment—what makes it the case that someone has taken on such a commitment?  \nIn this talk\, I suggest that the relevant commitment is a commitment to accept certain attributions of belief to oneself. I argue against proposals on which this commitment is grounded in epistemic factors\, such as how sure a hearer can be of what one has communicated. I explore an alternative proposal on which the commitment is grounded in expectations that partly constitute speakers’ participation in the joint activity of having a conversation. \n  \nSpeaking for Someone Else: Group Lies and Self-Less Assertions – Andreas Stokke \nThis talk compares cases of so-called “selfless assertions” with lies told by groups such as corporations or political parties. I argue that there are differences\, even though both involve speakers making assertions on behalf of someone else. I draw some conclusions concerning how to understand the involvement of the speaker’s attitudes in such cases. \n  \nTelling stories\, telling lies – Emanuel Viebahn \nIt is widely held that authors cannot lie in producing works of fiction: either you tell a story\, or you tell a lie. The first aim of this talk is to challenge this consensus. I will point to various cases in which authors should count as lying in telling stories. The second aim of the talk is to explore whether this suggests that it is possible to lie without asserting. \n  \nFichte’s World of Wordless Lies – Roy Sorensen \nImmanuel Kant was a moderate about lying! True\, he enlists among the battalion of never-liars. But Kant cushions `Never lie’ with a flexible weave of old and new distinctions. The true extremist about lying is Kant’s first German interpreter. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762 – 1814) disintegrates the distinctions designed to make `Never lie’ practical: lying/misleading\, discursive/pictorial representation\, commission/omission\, honesty/candor. Whereas Kant restricts lies to declarations (assertions and promises)\, Fichte counts the failure to correct an error as a lie. Contrary to Kant\, we all have a duty to perfect each other. We must prevent and correct error because false belief undermines free action. Any intentional deception\, verbal or non-verbal\, is therefore a lie. By Fichte’s reckoning\, Kant lied by wearing a wig. Kant overcame the temptation to save an innocent man from murder by lying. Fichte is mortified. Even to have considered lying was one thought too many! \n  \nLying: some insights from speech act theory – Neri Marsili \nThis talk revisits some traditional questions in the philosophy of lying through the lens of speech act theory – including whether lying always involves an attempt to deceive\, whether it is possible to lie without making an assertion\, and whether making a believed-true statement can constitute lying. The emerging picture offers a fresh perspective on the nature of lying\, shining new light on long-standing philosophical debates. \n 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/lying-without-assertion-workshop/
CATEGORIES:Workshops
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230606T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230606T140000
DTSTAMP:20230404T134908Z
CREATED:20230404T134255Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230404T134908Z
UID:10018047-1686052800-1686060000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-4/2023-06-06/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230607T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230607T180000
DTSTAMP:20230413T104137Z
CREATED:20230413T095053Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230413T104137Z
UID:10018619-1686153600-1686160800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosphy-and-social-theory-2/2023-06-07/
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230608T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230608T120000
DTSTAMP:20230111T164225Z
CREATED:20230111T164225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230111T164225Z
UID:10018298-1686218400-1686225600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SS Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/ss-seminar/2023-06-08/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230608T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230608T143000
DTSTAMP:20230605T131324Z
CREATED:20230403T104338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230605T131324Z
UID:10018594-1686229200-1686234600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Miriam Bowen (St Andrews) "Degrees of Belief and Neutral Attitudes"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Suspended judgment is a neutral attitude an agent can have towards a proposition. In the context of a traditional belief framework where an agent has belief or disbelief it seems natural to include the attitude of suspended judgement or at least withholding belief or disbelief. In this talk\, I will examine how we ought to understand suspended judgment and give an account of how suspended judgment should be understood in the context of degrees of belief. In particular\, I argue that suspended judgment should not be understood as having credence 0.5 since this fails to capture the neutrality of the attitude. \nI argue that suspended judgment should instead be understood as having imprecise credences. A version of this view has been offered by van Fraassen (1998). I show that his view also fails to capture the neutrality of suspended judgment but that by amending his view we can give conditions on the form and interpretation of imprecise credences that do capture suspended judgment in a credal framework.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar-miriam-bowen-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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