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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Arche
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221205T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221205T110000
DTSTAMP:20221128T184940Z
CREATED:20221128T184940Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221128T184940Z
UID:10017732-1670232600-1670238000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: John Dumbleton\, De Scire
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2022-10-03-2/2022-12-05/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
ORGANIZER;CN="Stephen Read":MAILTO:arche@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221205T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221205T170000
DTSTAMP:20221130T144306Z
CREATED:20221130T144306Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221130T144306Z
UID:10017747-1670252400-1670259600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Frederik Andersen (University of St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Modeling Deep Disagreement in Default Logic  \nAbstract: \nDefault logic has been a very active research topic in artificial intelligence since the early 1980s\, but has not received as much attention in the philosophical literature thus far. This paper shows one way in which the technical tools of artificial intelligence can be applied in contemporary epistemology by modeling a paradigmatic case of deep disagreement using default logic. In §1 model-building viewed as a kind of philosophical progress is briefly motivated\, while §2 introduces the case of deep disagreement we aim to model. On the heels of this\, §3 defines our formal framework\, viz.\, a refined Horty-style default logic. §4 then uses the framework to model deep disagreement\, and finally §5 provides a critical discussion of the result.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-2-2022-09-19-2022-10-17-8/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221206T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221206T140000
DTSTAMP:20221130T162312Z
CREATED:20221111T104618Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221130T162312Z
UID:10017761-1670328000-1670335200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar | Frank Sode (Goethe University Frankfurt) "On counterfactuality in counterfactuals and desire reports"
DESCRIPTION:The question I’m going to address in this talk is: Is there a deeper connection between the rules of use associated with (utterances of) counterfactuals and the rules of use associated with reports of counterfactual desires? Heim (1992) proposes a semantics for desire reports that suggests that the answer is: yes. Her proposal is based on the idea that “there is a hidden conditional in every desire report”\, an idea she traces back to Stalnaker (1984). In the first part of the talk\, I present a decompositional account of Heim’s proposal that reduces the rules of use associated with reports of counterfactual desires to the rules of use of counterfactuals and standard assumptions about the projection of presuppositions under attitudes. In the second part of the talk\, I present cross- linguistic data\, mainly based on von Fintel & Iatridou (2022) and my own work\, that show that in many languges there is a close grammatical connection between counterfactuals and reports of counterfactual desires. I argue that Heim’s conceptual idea if taken quite literally as an idea about the grammar of desire reports is the most promissing candidate to date in explaining the cross-linguistic facts. The surprising harmony between Heim’s conceptual idea and the empirical facts suggests that there may be an important lesson to be learned from grammar about the notional category of counterfactual desires.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-2022-12-06-2/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221207T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221207T180000
DTSTAMP:20221003T081846Z
CREATED:20220707T120014Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221003T081846Z
UID:10017776-1670428800-1670436000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory  Seminar: Lara Jost
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-2022-12-07/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221208T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221208T120000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145458Z
CREATED:20220707T120351Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145458Z
UID:10017788-1670493600-1670500800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-seminar-7/2022-12-08/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221208T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221208T143000
DTSTAMP:20221202T134046Z
CREATED:20221020T151759Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221202T134046Z
UID:10017808-1670504400-1670509800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews) "Permissivism and Inductive Risk"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Proponents of inductive risk make three claims: (1) When accepting or not-accepting a hypothesis\, a scientist qua scientist must weigh the risks of error. (2) In weighing the risks of error\, a scientist must resort to non-epistemic utilities. (3) Epistemically\, these (non-epistemic) utilities ought to merely play an indirect role.To make sense of (1)-(3)\, I will draw on recent discussions in epistemic utility theory concerning epistemic risk and Permissivism. Presupposing a Lockean Thesis\, epistemic risk requires us to make a decision as to whether to believe\, (suspend judgement on\,) or disbelieve a proposition in light of the risks of error. These risks of error can be of two kinds: believing a false proposition or not believing a true one. I will introduce three types of Permissivism within this epistemic risk framework that look particularly promising as a model for inductive risk. The first concerns the permissiveness of different decision rules (risk inclined\, risk neutral\, risk averse) while the other two types “encode” Permissivism in the epistemic utilities (how much one disvalues one type of error over the other). \nI will ultimately dismiss the decision-rule type of Permissivism as a suitable model of inductive risk\, and argue that the remaining two types of Permissivism both are attractive options for the proponent of inductive risk to endorse.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar-katharina-bernhard-st-andrews/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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