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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Arche
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221031T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221031T110000
DTSTAMP:20221019T223839Z
CREATED:20220707T113101Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T223839Z
UID:10017727-1667208600-1667214000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: John Dumbleton\, De Scire
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2022-10-03/2022-10-31/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
ORGANIZER;CN="Stephen Read":MAILTO:arche@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221031T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221031T170000
DTSTAMP:20221027T172312Z
CREATED:20221027T172311Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221027T172312Z
UID:10017742-1667228400-1667235600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Miriam Bowen (University of St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Indeterminacy and Rational Belief \nAbstract: \nThere are a variety of norms that purport to govern what attitude an agent ought to adopt. It is unclear\, however\, what attitude a rational agent ought to have towards an indeterminate proposition or whether there is a norm that prescribes an attitude. In this talk I address the normative question of what attitude a rational agent ought to adopt towards cases of indeterminacy. \nTo do so I defend the view that indeterminacy should be understood as an umbrella term that encompasses a range of related phenomena. In light of this I argue we should adopt a position I call modest pluralism to the normative question. Modest pluralism holds that there is no unique attitude an agent ought to adopt to cases of indeterminacy\, but rather a range of permissible attitudes to adopt. However\, I also argue that logical norms do underlie what attitudes it is rational for an agent to have in general and this provides a general constraint on the types of attitudes it is permissible for a rational agent to adopt towards cases of indeterminacy.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-2-2022-09-19-2022-10-17-3/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221101T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221101T140000
DTSTAMP:20221024T103939Z
CREATED:20220707T115653Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221024T103939Z
UID:10017756-1667304000-1667311200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar | Mahrad Almotahari "Blameless Irrationality and Frege’s Puzzle"
DESCRIPTION:I sketch a new puzzle about rational belief and use it to motivate the coherence of blameless irrationality. Relying on a recent framework developed by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Timothy Williamson\, I use the idea of blameless irrationality to argue that Frege’s Puzzle rests on a mistake: it poses no threat to coarse-grained conceptions of content.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-2022-11-01/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221102T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221102T180000
DTSTAMP:20221031T075804Z
CREATED:20220707T120014Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221031T075804Z
UID:10017772-1667404800-1667412000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory  Seminar: Elizabeth Barnes
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Limits of Trust: First Person Testimony\, Unreliability\, and the case of ‘Medical Gaslighting’\n\n\n  \nAbstract: Recent work in social and feminist epistemology has emphasized the importance of first-person testimony. But its sometimes unclear when and to what extent we are obligated to believe people’s testimony about their own experiences. I use Katherine Hawley’s framework of trust and trustworthiness to explore a particular example: the case of medical gaslighting and testimonial injustice in healthcare contexts. I argue that Hawley’s framework can help to illuminate places where concepts like ‘gaslighting’ and ‘testimonial injustice’ might be over-extended. \n\nThe seminar will take place online via teams 4-6pm. 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-2022-11-02/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221103T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221103T120000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145458Z
CREATED:20220707T120351Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145458Z
UID:10017784-1667469600-1667476800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-seminar-7/2022-11-03/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221103T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221103T143000
DTSTAMP:20221023T200152Z
CREATED:20220707T120554Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221023T200152Z
UID:10017797-1667480400-1667485800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Jessie Munton (Cambridge) "Resilient Ignorance or\, All The Things I Do Not Know and Refuse To Learn"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: I am ignorant of many things. Sometimes that ignorance seems epistemically permissible. At other times it seems impermissible. The problem of permissibility is the problem of providing a principled epistemic distinction between cases of permissible and impermissible ignorance. I argue that the problem of permissibility is particularly acute for evidentialism. Sensitivity to the evidence fails to distinguish cases of permissible and impermissible ignorance: ignorance can be impermissible in the absence of evidence\, and permissible in the face of it. This threatens the evidentialist claim that evidence is the crucial epistemic difference-maker. Instead\, I suggest that problematic cases of ignorance tend to be resilient. Capturing the epistemic significance of that resiliences requires us to expand the scope of our epistemic norms\, to include the salience structures that underwrite our dispositions to gather and respond to evidence more broadly.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar-2022-11-03/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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