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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Arche
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220606T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220606T110000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145630Z
CREATED:20210628T115628Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145630Z
UID:10017539-1654507800-1654513200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2/2022-06-06/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220606T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220606T170000
DTSTAMP:20220531T150506Z
CREATED:20210628T121010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220531T150506Z
UID:10017574-1654527600-1654534800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Koji Tanaka (Australian National University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: An Empirical and Normative Argument for Paraconsistency \nAbstract: \nGraham Priest has presented various arguments for paraconsistent logic. One line of argument is based on the alleged discrepancy between the principles of classical logic\, in particular\, ex contradictione quodlibet (A\, ¬A ⊨ B for any A and B) and how we rationally reason. As such an argument requires a broadly empirical methodology\, I call it an empirical argument for paraconsistent logic. Florian Steinberger has challenged this line of argument by claiming that it relies on the assumption that logic is normative and that no normative argument can be given in support of paraconsistent logic. In this paper\, I will examine Steinberger’s challenge and argue that the challenge consists of problematic assumptions. I will\, thus\, defend Priest’s empirical and normative argument for paraconsistent logic.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-6-2022-06-06/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220607T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220607T140000
DTSTAMP:20220520T093500Z
CREATED:20210628T122532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220520T093500Z
UID:10017589-1654603200-1654610400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: NO SEMINAR / SUMMER REFLECTORIUM
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-9-2022-04-05-2022-06-07/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220607T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220607T170000
DTSTAMP:20220606T074008Z
CREATED:20210629T142203Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220606T074008Z
UID:10017684-1654614000-1654621200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar: Catherine Herfeld (Zurich) “Thick Concepts in Economics”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In this talk\, we examine the viability of avoiding value judgements encoded in thick concepts when such thick concepts are used in economic theories. Thick concepts have an evaluative and a descriptive component. We focus on what implications the use of such thick concepts might have for the tenability of the fact/value dichotomy in economics. Our suggestion is that despite attempts to rid thick concepts of their evaluative component\, economists are often not successful. To support this suggestion\, we focus on the strategy of explication to remove the evaluative component of thick concepts and argue that often economists either have to make value judgments or are unable to individuate out the phenomenon under analysis. We support our claim with a case study\, namely the concept of addiction in Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy’s Theory of Rational Addiction (1988). One consequence of this analysis is that theories containing thick concepts could commit the economists to making value judgements and as such undermine the fact/value dichotomy.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-5-2022-06-07/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220608T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220608T180000
DTSTAMP:20220606T085451Z
CREATED:20210629T140652Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220606T085451Z
UID:10017655-1654704000-1654711200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Quill R Kukla
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Public Artifacts and Collective Material Testimony”\n\n\nAbstract: Some features of the built public landscape\, like monuments\, memorials\, murals\, plazas\, arches\, and the like\, can be testimony. More specifically\, some of them can provide what I call collective material testimony – that is\, they serve as the testimony of a collective or group. I explore the nature of this testimony\, asking who its speaker is\, who it speaks to\, and what it says. I then argue that this testimony is often especially compelling\, in the sense that it is especially likely to transmit belief.  But\, I claim\, it is also especially untrustworthy\, both in the sense that its content is often false and in the sense that it is misleading as to its speaker and the grounds of its authority. Because it is both compelling and untrustworthy\, it is epistemically risky.I end by briefly considering what might make it more trustworthy and how we as epistemic agents can read our landscapes responsibly. \n  \n\n\n\nThis seminar will take place 4-6 pm June 8th in a hybrid format. The in-person seminar will be at Castlecliffe G5W\, to receive the link to attend online please email arche-fem-soc[at]st-andrews.ac.uk.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-s2-2022-06-08/
LOCATION:Castlecliffe room G5W
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T120000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145615Z
CREATED:20210629T140951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145615Z
UID:10017668-1654768800-1654776000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-2022-04-07/2022-06-09/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T143000
DTSTAMP:20220523T082135Z
CREATED:20210629T150804Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220523T082135Z
UID:10017709-1654779600-1654785000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Silvia De Toffoli (Princeton) "Mathematical Justification – Motivations for a Fallibilist Account"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: According to a widely held view in the philosophy of mathematics\, direct inferential justification for mathematical propositions (that are not axioms) requires proof. I challenge this view. I argue that certain fallacious mathematical arguments considered by the relevant subjects to be correct can confer mathematical justification. But mathematical justification doesn’t come for cheap: not just any argument will do. I suggest that\, in order to be successful in transmitting justification\, an argument must satisfy specific standards\, some of which are social. The picture I delineate is a hybrid form of phenomenal conservatism. Although in this talk I focus on mathematical inferential beliefs\, the view on offer generalizes straightforwardly to other inferential beliefs.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-5-2022-06-09/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T173000
DTSTAMP:20220606T093053Z
CREATED:20220420T085704Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220606T093053Z
UID:10017718-1654790400-1654795800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Brian Hedden (ANU) [Hybrid] "Counterfactual Decision Theory"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: I defend counterfactual decision theory\, which says that you should evaluate an act in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain\, were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from\, and superior to\, causal decision theory. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination\, an act can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution\, an act can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. In cases of determinism\, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your act\, even though your act cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases\, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict\, and for the right reasons. \nRoom: School V. \nJoin online via Teams.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-brian-hedder-anu-hybrid/
LOCATION:School V and via MS Teams\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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