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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Arche
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220502T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220502T110000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145630Z
CREATED:20210628T115628Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145630Z
UID:10017534-1651483800-1651489200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2/2022-05-02/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220502T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220502T170000
DTSTAMP:20220428T135652Z
CREATED:20210628T121010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220428T135652Z
UID:10017569-1651503600-1651510800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar
DESCRIPTION:No meeting due to May bank holiday.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-6-2022-05-02/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220503T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220503T140000
DTSTAMP:20220428T103107Z
CREATED:20210628T122532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220428T103107Z
UID:10017584-1651579200-1651586400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Nicholas Shea (Institute of Philosophy)
DESCRIPTION:Concept-Driven Suppositional Scenarios \n  \nWork on concepts has concentrated on categorization. Categorization is a process that starts with perceptual representations (and other domain-specific resources) and transitions to a conceptual representation. Just as important\, however\, are inferences that\, rather than being driven by current stimuli\, start with conceptual representations. Often we engage in ‘offline’ thinking to formulate plans and take decisions. We derive consequences from facts that we remember and episodes that we have experienced. The usual paradigm for conceptually-driven thinking is reasoning. Reasoning moves from some concept-involving thoughts to others. Reasoning deploys a domain-general computational process\, rather like theorem-proving in logic\, and uses a domain-general representational system\, that of conceptual thought. \nOften overlooked between these two paradigms is the way that offline processing driven by conceptual thought draws on special-purpose resources: sensory\, motoric\, affective\, or supra-modal (e.g. the cognitive map of space). The phenomenon itself if familiar: we imagine a situation or think through counterfactual scenarios using representations from special-purpose systems. It encompasses simulation\, prospection and some forms of imagination. What is under-theorised is how suppositional thinking driven by conceptual representations works computationally. \nIn this paper I ask: what information do these kinds of inferences draw on\, how is it encoded\, and what kinds of computational process operate on it? I will argue that information is encoded in three quite distinct ways. As well as being represented explicitly in conceptually structured thoughts\, suppositional thinking draws on information represented implicitly in the computational dispositions of domain-specific systems\, and on information represented explicitly but in a domain-specific way in structural representations in special-purpose systems. There is also a fundamental difference in how the computations work. Computations in domain-specific systems are usually ‘content-specific’\, whereas computations over explicit representations in conceptual thought call for a quite different capacity\, the capacity for ‘non-content-specific’ computation. The paper will define\, illustrate and defend this new distinction.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-9-2022-04-05-2022-05-03/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220503T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220503T170000
DTSTAMP:20220430T113548Z
CREATED:20210629T142203Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220430T113548Z
UID:10017679-1651590000-1651597200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar: Peter Railton (UMich) "Scaffolding Normative Concepts: Social Change\, Personal Development\, and Reverse Engineering"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Our normative concepts—theoretical and practical—often seem to function as ways of presenting potential solutions to problems that are characteristic of our shared lives: What to think? What to do? What to feel? How to live and work together? This fits a number of the features of normative concepts\, such as their putative thought- and action-guidingness\, their projectability into novel situations\, their openness with respect to change\, and the supervenience of the normative properties they identify upon non-normative properties. Perhaps solutions developed in practice have been a scaffold for the development of normative concepts\, which in turn have afforded a framework for prospective responses to one another and to our world. (“Solutions” here should not be read as ultimately successful solutions\, or as something we’d endorse—solutions to problems of social stability\, for example\, have taken many forms through pre-history and history\, only some of which any of us might now advocate.) Looking at the history of some central normative concepts\, and also their appearance in psychological development\, we can see patterns that resemble what we would expect if some such picture of the distinctive role and character of normative concepts held. If so\, then reverse-engineering of our normative concepts could be a worthwhile research program in philosophy\, psychology\, and cognitive science—indeed\, it has begun in earnest in cognitive science. Reverse-engineering can also be a basis for criticism\, and can afford resources for constructive approach to conceptual change.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-5-2022-05-03/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220504T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220504T180000
DTSTAMP:20220503T105909Z
CREATED:20210629T140652Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220503T105909Z
UID:10017650-1651680000-1651687200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Jade Fletcher
DESCRIPTION:Dr Jade Fletcher will be giving a presentation titled “Realism and Debunking about Social Kinds” from 4-6 pm Wednesday May 4th. It is a Hyrbid event taking place in Castecliffe Seminar Room G5W and Teams. For any queries or a link to join the online meeting please email arche-fem-soc[at]st-andrews.ac.uk. \nRealism and Debunking about Social Kinds   \nDebates about realism and anti-realism in social constructionist metaphysics persist. Often\, conceptions of realism stated in terms of mind-independence tend to rule out social kinds from being really real. Recently\, there has been a lot of push-back by social metaphysicians to anti-realist readings of social constructionism. Defending the reality of a social kind is then understood to consist in showing that it is sufficiently objective\, that it is causally efficacious\, or perhaps deflating the distinction between the natural and the social. \nThis paper aims to articulate an often-ignored conception of realism which does justice to the core theoretical purpose of a range of social constructionist theories. According to epistemic conceptions of realism\, realism should be characterised by the possibility of substantive error. For the realist\, the search for truth is a matter of discovery not invention\, and success is not guaranteed. I argue that this epistemological conception of realism best captures the aims and methods of the those social constructionist theories that aim to debunk our ordinary beliefs about the social world.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-s2-2022-05-04/
LOCATION:Castlecliffe room G5W
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220505T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220505T120000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145615Z
CREATED:20210629T140951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145615Z
UID:10017663-1651744800-1651752000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-2022-04-07/2022-05-05/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220505T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220505T143000
DTSTAMP:20220502T171301Z
CREATED:20210629T150804Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220502T171301Z
UID:10017704-1651755600-1651761000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CANCELLED: Epistemology Seminar: Liz Jackson (Ryerson) "A Defense of Belief-Credence Dualism"
DESCRIPTION:This event has been cancelled and will be postponed to a later date. \nAbstract:  Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and both attitudes are equally fundamental. Here\, I defend belief-credence dualism. First\, I explain five views about the ontology of beliefs and credences: belief-eliminativism\, credence-first\, dualism\, belief-first\, and credence-eliminativism. After briefly explaining why I reject eliminativist views\, I motivate dualism by arguing that the remaining views\, belief-first (that belief is more fundamental) and credence-first (that credence is more fundamental) cannot account for various roles of each attitude. 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-5-2022-05-05/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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