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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220411T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220411T173000
DTSTAMP:20220428T140329Z
CREATED:20210628T121010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220428T140329Z
UID:10017566-1649667600-1649698200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Workshop: Logical Disagreement
DESCRIPTION:Over the past fifteen years the epistemology of disagreement has been one of the most widely discussed research topics in epistemology. A special case of disagreement is logical disagreement\, i.e. disputes regarding the validity of certain inferences\, or the status of fundamental logical principles. This one-day Arché workshop is dedicated to the topic Disagreement in Logic and related issues such as logical pluralism\, the normativity of logic\, logical evidence. It will feature renowned experts of the epistemology of logic as well as early-career researchers. \nVenue: G03\, Edgecliffe\nTime: From 9am till 6pm on Monday April 11th\, 2022 (GMT)\nFormat: In person\nRegistration:  Please register your interest in attending by emailing our workshop organisers at fja4@st-andrews.ac.uk. \nSchedule\n• 9.00-9.30 Coffee and registration\n• 9.30-10.30 Speaker: Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm University)\nTitle: A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\n• 10.30-11.00 Coffee\n• 11.00-12.00 Speaker: Alessandro Rossi (NCH)\nTitle: The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\n• 12.00-13.30 Lunch (vegetarian and vegan options available)\n• 13.30-14.30 Speaker: Claire Field (University of Stirling)\nTitle: Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\n• 14.30-15.00 Coffee\n• 15.00-16.00 Frederik J. Andersen (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: Logical Akrasia\n• 16.00-16.30 Coffee\n• 16.30-17.30 Speaker: Jc Beall (University of Notre Dame)\nTitle: Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic \nTitles and Abstracts \nAnandi Hattiangadi—A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\nLogical disagreement is comprehensive: proponents of different logics disagree not only about the validity of particular logical laws\, but about the meanings of the logical constants\, and about the meaning or extension of the concept of logical consequence itself. This raises a puzzle. On the face of it\, there appear to be genuine disagreements about logic. However\, genuine disagreement requires a common subject matter about which to disagree: if A and B are not talking about the same thing\, then they are talking past one another; any apparent disagreement between them is merely verbal. The trouble is that since logical disagreement is so often comprehensive\, proponents of different logics seem to have too little in common to determine a common subject matter about which to disagree. If A and B apparently disagree whether some logical law is valid\, but they use ‘valid’ with different meanings or extensions\, they are talking past one another; their disagreement is merely verbal. My aim in this paper will be to explore this puzzle. \nAlessandro Rossi—The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\nConstant domain S5\, or the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\, seems to demand that we take (non)concreteness as a contingent feature of things. But could there be two equally correct views about the ontology of the contingently non-concrete? It is shown that a similar thesis incurs a principled and necessary refutation. Three objections to our claim are then considered and all are found wanting. \nClaire Field—Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\nIf logical pluralism is true\, then rational disagreement about logic is possible. Is rational disagreement also possible if logical pluralism is false? That is\, is it possible to rationally disagree about which is the correct logic\, while also being mistaken? Some have thought not\, and that it must always be irrational to believe falsely about what is rationally required (Titelbaum 2015). In so far as the correct logic encodes what is rationally required\, this means that mistakes about it cannot be rational. I compare this question to analogous one about non-logical requirements of rationality\, and show how answering it is somewhat more complicated for logical requirements\, because of the possibility that weighing one’s evidence implicates a background logic. I explore a proposal for treating mistakes about logical and non-logical requirements in the same way\, and argue that this gives us reason to think that level-incoherence is sometimes rationally required. \nFrederik J. Andersen—Logical Akrasia\nThe aim of this paper is twofold. First\, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia pace analogy to epistemic akrasia. Second\, §3 and §4 present a dilemma based on logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano arithmetic or akratic in our logical theorizing. It will then be left as an open question for future research what consequences the dilemma has for epistemic rationality. \nJc Beall—Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic\nAn account L of logical consequence (henceforth\, of logic) is subclassical if and only if \ni) every classically invalid argument is invalid according to L\, and\nii) some classically valid argument is invalid according to L. \nIn this talk I argue that the true account of logic is subclassical. (That’s the “classical logic is dead” part.) On the other hand—I believe (and so do you)—the vast majority of our true theories are classically closed; they rely on the full force of classical logic. And so such theories do; and so such theories should. (This is the “long live classical logic” part.) But there is no tension whatsoever in the death of classical logic together with its apparent ubiquity in our true theories. So I shall argue in this talk.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-6-2022-04-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220411
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220413
DTSTAMP:20220517T125304Z
CREATED:20211214T091754Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220517T125304Z
UID:10017714-1649667600-1649753999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Logical Disagreement
DESCRIPTION:Over the past fifteen years the epistemology of disagreement has been one of the most widely discussed research topics in epistemology. A special case of disagreement is logical disagreement\, i.e. disputes regarding the validity of certain inferences\, or the status of fundamental logical principles. This one-day Arché workshop is dedicated to the topic Disagreement in Logic and related issues such as logical pluralism\, the normativity of logic\, logical evidence. It will feature renowned experts of the epistemology of logic as well as early-career researchers. \nVenue: G03\, Edgecliffe\nTime: From 9am till 6pm on Monday April 11th\, 2022 (GMT)\nFormat: In person\nRegistration:  Please register your interest in attending by emailing our workshop organisers at fja4@st-andrews.ac.uk. \nSchedule\n• 9.00-9.30 Coffee and registration\n• 9.30-10.30 Speaker: Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm University)\nTitle: A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\n• 10.30-11.00 Coffee\n• 11.00-12.00 Speaker: Alessandro Rossi (NCH)\nTitle: The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\n• 12.00-13.30 Lunch (vegetarian and vegan options available)\n• 13.30-14.30 Speaker: Claire Field (University of Stirling)\nTitle: Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\n• 14.30-15.00 Coffee\n• 15.00-16.00 Frederik J. Andersen (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: Logical Akrasia\n• 16.00-16.30 Coffee\n• 16.30-17.30 Speaker: Jc Beall (University of Notre Dame)\nTitle: Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic \nTitles and Abstracts \nAnandi Hattiangadi—A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\nLogical disagreement is comprehensive: proponents of different logics disagree not only about the validity of particular logical laws\, but about the meanings of the logical constants\, and about the meaning or extension of the concept of logical consequence itself. This raises a puzzle. On the face of it\, there appear to be genuine disagreements about logic. However\, genuine disagreement requires a common subject matter about which to disagree: if A and B are not talking about the same thing\, then they are talking past one another; any apparent disagreement between them is merely verbal. The trouble is that since logical disagreement is so often comprehensive\, proponents of different logics seem to have too little in common to determine a common subject matter about which to disagree. If A and B apparently disagree whether some logical law is valid\, but they use ‘valid’ with different meanings or extensions\, they are talking past one another; their disagreement is merely verbal. My aim in this paper will be to explore this puzzle. \nAlessandro Rossi—The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\nConstant domain S5\, or the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\, seems to demand that we take (non)concreteness as a contingent feature of things. But could there be two equally correct views about the ontology of the contingently non-concrete? It is shown that a similar thesis incurs a principled and necessary refutation. Three objections to our claim are then considered and all are found wanting. \nClaire Field—Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\nIf logical pluralism is true\, then rational disagreement about logic is possible. Is rational disagreement also possible if logical pluralism is false? That is\, is it possible to rationally disagree about which is the correct logic\, while also being mistaken? Some have thought not\, and that it must always be irrational to believe falsely about what is rationally required (Titelbaum 2015). In so far as the correct logic encodes what is rationally required\, this means that mistakes about it cannot be rational. I compare this question to analogous one about non-logical requirements of rationality\, and show how answering it is somewhat more complicated for logical requirements\, because of the possibility that weighing one’s evidence implicates a background logic. I explore a proposal for treating mistakes about logical and non-logical requirements in the same way\, and argue that this gives us reason to think that level-incoherence is sometimes rationally required. \nFrederik J. Andersen—Logical Akrasia\nThe aim of this paper is twofold. First\, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia pace analogy to epistemic akrasia. Second\, §3 and §4 present a dilemma based on logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano arithmetic or akratic in our logical theorizing. It will then be left as an open question for future research what consequences the dilemma has for epistemic rationality. \nJc Beall—Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic\nAn account L of logical consequence (henceforth\, of logic) is subclassical if and only if \ni) every classically invalid argument is invalid according to L\, and\nii) some classically valid argument is invalid according to L. \nIn this talk I argue that the true account of logic is subclassical. (That’s the “classical logic is dead” part.) On the other hand—I believe (and so do you)—the vast majority of our true theories are classically closed; they rely on the full force of classical logic. And so such theories do; and so such theories should. (This is the “long live classical logic” part.) But there is no tension whatsoever in the death of classical logic together with its apparent ubiquity in our true theories. So I shall argue in this talk. \n 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/disagreement-in-logic/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/WLD-e1645456834730.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220411T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220411T110000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145630Z
CREATED:20210628T115628Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145630Z
UID:10017531-1649669400-1649674800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2/2022-04-11/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220412T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220412T140000
DTSTAMP:20220406T094813Z
CREATED:20210628T122532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220406T094813Z
UID:10017581-1649764800-1649772000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Stefano Pugnaghi (St Andrews / Bonn)
DESCRIPTION:Predicativism\, Metasemantics and Circularity
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-9-2022-04-05-2022-04-12/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220412T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220412T170000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145603Z
CREATED:20210629T142203Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145603Z
UID:10017676-1649775600-1649782800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-5-2022-04-12/2022-04-12/
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar,Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220413T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220413T180000
DTSTAMP:20220405T152430Z
CREATED:20210629T140652Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220405T152430Z
UID:10017647-1649865600-1649872800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Lara Jost\, "The Labours of Chronic Illness"
DESCRIPTION:Lara Jost will be giving the following presentation\, titled The Labours of Chronic Illness. The seminar will take a hyrbid format. The in-person seminar will take place Castlecliffe G5W – Seminar Room. To attend online please email arche-fem-soc@st-andrews.ac.uk for the attendance link. \n\n\n\nThe Labours of Chronic Illness\nLara Jost \n\n\nIn this presentation\, I aim to explain two types of labour – hermeneutic labour and epistemic labour- that chronically ill people have to engage in to get good care. The goal is to highlight why being chronically ill is often considered by many chronically ill people to be a full-time or part-time job\, often without being recognized as such by others. I explain why these two labours are disproportionately higher when it comes to certain chronic illnesses. I discuss how these labours cannot be fully explained by the presence of political structures and the underfunding of healthcare. Contrary to these two commonly accepted explanations\, I argue that this higher cost is in part the result of a deep disagreement about how these patients should testify about their illness\, caused by a cluster of types of epistemic injustices. To illustrate this dynamic\, I attend to the applied case of endometriosis\, a gynaecological chronic illness causing pelvic pain and infertility.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-s2-2022-04-13/
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T120000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145615Z
CREATED:20210629T140951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145615Z
UID:10017662-1649930400-1649937600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-2022-04-07/2022-04-14/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T173000
DTSTAMP:20220405T092503Z
CREATED:20210629T150804Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220405T092503Z
UID:10017701-1649952000-1649957400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA): David Christensen (Brown) "Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes\, and what she believes about what she’s rational to believe. Epistemic akrasia—for example\, believing P while believing that P is not rational to believe in your situation—is often seen as intrinsically irrational. This paper argues otherwise. In certain cases\, akrasia is intuitively rational. Understanding why akratic beliefs in those case are indeed rational provides a deeper explanation how typical akratic beliefs are irrational—an explanation that does not flow from akrasia per se. This understanding also allows us to diagnose where general anti-akratic arguments go wrong. We can then see why even principles designed to allow only moderate akrasia fail\, and also why recognizing the possibility of rational akratic beliefs does not call for finding some other epistemic defect in agents who believe akratically. Believing akratically\, in itself\, is nothing to apologize for.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-5/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
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