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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240501T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240501T170000
DTSTAMP:20240425T135604Z
CREATED:20240327T151307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240425T135604Z
UID:10018856-1714575600-1714582800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Roy Sorensen (UT Austin and University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Seeing Holes-without seeing what they are holes in \nAbstract: Peering down into a tall box\, you see a ring. The ring is removed. To your surprise this uncovers a second duplicate ring. Did you see the hole of the bottom ring before you saw the bottom ring? Each answer is backed by good reasons. I resolve the antinomy by arguing yes: you saw the bottom hole without seeing what it was a hole in! Therefore\, a hole cannot be a part of what it is a hole in – its host. For a hole can be seen without seeing its host. Nor can a hole be an intrinsic property of its host\, such as its shape. Nor can it be a way of seeing its host. Seeing a hole is not a matter of seeing the matter in which it is a hole. The metaphysical dependence of a hole on its host does not make it perceptually dependent. Seeing a hole merely requires matter to serve as a visual aid. This loosened association between hosts and holes confirms other theories of holes such as the theory that holes are spacetime regions. \nThere will be a little magic show to illustrate the nature of holes and how they are seen.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-19-6/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T120000
DTSTAMP:20240521T093518Z
CREATED:20240326T160125Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240521T093518Z
UID:10019054-1714644000-1714651200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-3/2024-05-02/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T143000
DTSTAMP:20240415T144316Z
CREATED:20240320T134033Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240415T144316Z
UID:10018776-1714654800-1714660200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Carlotta Pavese (Cornell University)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Carlotta Pavese (Cornell University) \nAre there essentially intentional actions? \nA long tradition in action theory holds that there are such things as essentially intentional actions—actions that are intentional whenever performed (Anscombe\, Davidson\, Bennett\, Turri\, etc). In my talk\, I argue that the existence of essentially intentional action is a philosophical myth and that this has interesting repercussions in action theory and in epistemology. In the first part of my talk\, I defend the claim that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions is incompatible with a desirable practical knowledge condition on intentional actions\, which I argue we have independent reasons to embrace. In the second part of my talk I argue that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions is incompatible with a plausible solution to a puzzle—the puzzle of novice learning—-that arises for certain kinds of theories of action and I contend that is an additional reason to reject the doctrine. Finally\, I explore some interesting conclusions that follow from rejecting the doctrine of essentially intentional actions.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-7-13/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T170000
DTSTAMP:20240320T135242Z
CREATED:20240320T135242Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240320T135242Z
UID:10018841-1714662000-1714669200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity: No Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/unity-no-seminar/
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T140000
DTSTAMP:20240426T085550Z
CREATED:20240426T085426Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T085550Z
UID:10018923-1715083200-1715090400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Roy Sorensen (University of St Andrews and UT Austin)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Kant risk a lie!\n\nAbstract: Immanuel Kant says\, “lying is the chief sin against others\, alongside robbery\, murder and stuproviolatio”. Kant never risks robbery\, murder\, or rape. But Kant does risk telling intentionally deceptive falsehoods. Instead of being a man a few words\, Kant is a man of three million words. Equally revealing is the scale of Augustine’s corpus: He wrote five million words before he died in 403 at age 75. Augustine was surpassed by Thomas Aquinas: eight million words before reporting a divine revelation to stop writing\, a few months before his death in 1274 at age 48. Each of these three proponents of `Never lie’ take some steps to lower the risk of lying. But their precautions are at the same scale as those who have an average aversion to lying. Accordingly\, all of those famed for their absolute opposition to lying drastically overstate the degree to which they oppose lying.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-30/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T170000
DTSTAMP:20240429T170052Z
CREATED:20240408T102402Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240429T170052Z
UID:10018989-1715094000-1715101200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar - Kate Manne (Cornell University) [online only]
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Authority of Hunger \nAbstract: In this talk\, I canvass moral considerations that suggest that hunger is morally authoritative. What’s more\, trying to circumvent our hunger via current surgical and pharmaceutical technologies is risky\, unpleasant\, and often ineffective. I conclude by considering the case for avoiding even “silver bullet” appetite suppressants\, for the sake of avoiding bodily self-alienation\, enjoying the pleasure and sense of community that comes from satisfying our hunger (often in the company of loved ones)\, and also for the sake of resisting the oppressive norms of fatphobia.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-12-5/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240508T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240508T170000
DTSTAMP:20240422T122753Z
CREATED:20240327T151506Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T122753Z
UID:10018857-1715180400-1715187600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Zoé McConaughey (University of Lille)
DESCRIPTION:Title: History of logic as a tool for exploring the plurality of logical frameworks \nAbstract: \nI will outline another type of logical pluralism than the one now famously proposed by Beall and Restall (2006). I will argue that in addition to paying attention to particular logics\, such as classical\, intuitionnistic\, relevance logics\, etc.\, it is important to study the different frameworks in which these particular logics are expressed\, such a model-theoretic\, proof-theoretic\, or game-theoretic frameworks. This provides a different kind of logical pluralism\, namely a pluralism for logical frameworks. It is a dimension to take into account when studying logics from different cultures\, which should be of particular interest to feminist or decolonial approaches to logic\, but also when studying logics from different times\, and I will focus on this point\, taking Aristotle’s logic as a case study.\nBy comparing different modern formalizations of Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic\, I will highlight the fact that the choice of logical framework injects within a particular logic (syllogistic in this case) the basic principles constitutive of this framework. In this fashion\, an uncritical formalization of an ancient logic risks injecting in the ancient texts the modern logician’s preconceptions regarding what logic is\, inherited from their preferred logical framework. I will present the dialogical reconstruction of syllogistic I worked out in my PhD dissertation (2021) in order to show that different logical paradigms are embedded in logical frameworks\, and can completely change the meaning of logic\, even when the logical result stay the same.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-19-7/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T120000
DTSTAMP:20240521T093518Z
CREATED:20240326T160125Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240521T093518Z
UID:10019055-1715248800-1715256000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-3/2024-05-09/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T143000
DTSTAMP:20240504T154420Z
CREATED:20240306T151853Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240504T154420Z
UID:10018777-1715259600-1715265000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Jade Fletcher (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Jade Fletcher (St Andrews) \nPractices\, Normativity\, and Ideological Construction: Conceptualizing Epistemic (In)Justice \nThe aim of this exploratory paper is to put into dialogue two different threads in contemporary social philosophy. Charles Mills made a helpful interjection into the epistemic injustice literature when he suggested that the concept of ideology is valuable for analytic epistemologists. Sally Haslanger has developed a metaphysics which captures how ethically pernicious ideologies can construct unjust social realities. In this paper I want to explore how this metaphysics of the social world might complicate our understanding of the nature of epistemic injustice\, and consequently our conception of the demands of epistemic justice. This is to accept Mills’ invitation to take more seriously the explanatory potency of ideology when theorising epistemic injustice\, but\, following Haslanger\, I understand ideologies to be metaphysically productive. I argue that this metaphysical reframing brings to light a potentially misguided theoretical orientation that pervades the epistemic injustice literature.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-8/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T170000
DTSTAMP:20240327T123324Z
CREATED:20240320T135255Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240327T123324Z
UID:10018850-1715266800-1715274000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity Pre-Reading: Gärdenfors Ch. 4
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/unity-pre-reading-gardenfors-ch-4/
LOCATION:Arché Seminar Room\, 17-19 College Street\, St Andrews\, KY169AL
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
GEO:56.3408615;-2.7948441
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=Arché Seminar Room 17-19 College Street St Andrews KY169AL;X-APPLE-RADIUS=500;X-TITLE=17-19 College Street:geo:-2.7948441,56.3408615
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T140000
DTSTAMP:20240430T155604Z
CREATED:20240430T155504Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240430T155604Z
UID:10018924-1715688000-1715695200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Matteo Nizzardo (University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Probabilistic Arbitrary Reference\n\nABSTRACT: Arbitrary Reference is the idea that we can refer to individual entities with some degree of arbitrariness. Although there are different accounts of Arbitrary Reference\, nearly all of them can be challenged on the basis that they entail the existence of free-floating semantic facts\, namely: semantic facts which are not grounded in any non-semantic fact. In this talk I propose a solution. First I argue that the friends of Arbitrary Reference can answer the challenge by appealing to the notion of indeterministic grounding. Then I propose a new account of Arbitrary Reference as a probabilistic phenomenon\, and argue that this new account should be preferred over the classical versions of Arbitrary Reference for its ability to build a bridge between cases of canonical and arbitrary reference and the new insights it offers on the phenomenon of semantic vagueness.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-31/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T170000
DTSTAMP:20240506T125110Z
CREATED:20240506T125109Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240506T125110Z
UID:10018990-1715698800-1715706000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar (in person) - Miguel de la Cal Moreno (reading group)
DESCRIPTION:This week we will be doing a reading group on Lorna Finlayson’s ‘There Is No Alternative: Constructiveness and Political Criticism’\, chapter one of her book ‘The Political is Political’. Get in touch for a copy of the reading.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-12-12/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240515T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240515T170000
DTSTAMP:20240506T105441Z
CREATED:20240327T151619Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240506T105441Z
UID:10018858-1715785200-1715792400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Sabina Domínguez Parrado (University of St Andrews and University of Amsterdam)
DESCRIPTION:Title: A New Problem for Logical Contextualism \nAbstract: Logical contextualism is the view that ‘valid’ is a context-sensitive expression. One key reason to endorse logical contextualism is that\, unlike traditional forms of logical pluralism\, it can avoid the so-called collapse problem. Logical contextualism relies on the crucial assumption that each conversational context determines a uniquely appropriate logical consequence relation. In this talk\, I argue for two points. First\, I put pressure on this crucial assumption by focusing on the design of several card-selection tasks. Second\, I show that\, once this assumption is rejected\, logical contextualism does not solve the collapse problem. In light of these two points\, my conclusion will be that logical contextualism\, as currently developed\, is a less promising view than thus far appreciated.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-19-8/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T120000
DTSTAMP:20240521T093518Z
CREATED:20240326T160125Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240521T093518Z
UID:10019056-1715853600-1715860800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-3/2024-05-16/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T143000
DTSTAMP:20240510T180113Z
CREATED:20240320T133046Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240510T180113Z
UID:10018778-1715864400-1715869800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Roy Sorensen (UT Austin & St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Roy Sorensen (UT Austin & St Andrews) \nModesty is a Contagious Blindspot \nI am modest about my spelling accuracy. Oops\, I cannot consistently believe that! Modesty about my spelling entails I underestimate my spelling. If I indeed underestimate my spelling accuracy\, then my ignorance about spelling accuracy is contagious. For if I believe you and I are equals at spelling\, then my modesty commits me to underestimating your spelling. Morally\, you may rightly resent my underestimate! You may also suffer intellectually. In addition to my ignorance of my merit spreading to my ignorance of your merit\, my ignorance can make you ignorant. For if you and I are epistemic peers\, then the limits of my knowledge become the limits of your knowledge. After all\, how do you know that I am modest rather than accurate? In general\, any modesty I possess robs my peers. Modesty is a vice rather than a virtue!
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-7-4/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T170000
DTSTAMP:20240514T150529Z
CREATED:20240320T135318Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240514T150529Z
UID:10018842-1715871600-1715878800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity Pre-Reading: Natural Concepts
DESCRIPTION:Douven\, Igor & Gärdenfors\, Peter (2019). What are natural concepts? A design perspective. Mind and Language (3):313-334. \nhttps://philpapers.org/archive/DOUWAN.pdf
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/unity-work-in-progress-cecily-whiteley/
LOCATION:Castclecliffe G5W
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240520
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240523
DTSTAMP:20250114T142437Z
CREATED:20231103T111724Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250114T142437Z
UID:10018751-1716195600-1716368399@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:The Epistemology of Inquiry
DESCRIPTION:The event is hybrid and open to philosophy faculty and students outside St Andrews. Remote participants can access the teams link by requesting it from Patrick Winther-Larsen (pjwl@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Jessica Brown (jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk). \nSpeakers: \nEndre Begby (Simon Fraser University)\nSanford Goldberg (Northwestern/St Andrews)\nJoshua Habgood-Coote (Leeds)\nChris Kelp (Glasgow)\nJulia Staffel (Colorado)\nElise Woodard (KCL\, London) \nProgramme: \nMay 20th:  \n11:30AM — 1PM: Sanford Goldberg; \n1PM — 2PM: Lunch; \n2PM — 3:30PM: Joshua Habgood-Coote; \n3:30PM — 4PM: afternoon coffee/tea plus biscuits; \n4PM — 5:30PM: Elise Woodard; \nDinner: 6:30 at Forgans \nMay 21st:  \n9:30AM — 11AM: Chris Kelp; \n11AM — 11:30AM: morning tea/coffee; \n11:30AM — 1PM: Julia Staffel; \n1PM — 2PM: lunch; \n2PM — 3:30PM: Endre Begby. \nAbstracts\nEndre Begby. Doxastic and zetetic norms: mutually dependent and equally fundamental \nThe recent resurgence of interest in the epistemology of inquiry has produced a discussion that is generally structured around the following types of questions: (i) granted that in addition to norms governing how we should form our beliefs in light of our evidence (“doxastic norms”) there also exist norms governing what we should do to provide ourselves with evidence in the first place (“zetetic norms”). But are these latter norms properly construed as epistemic norms\, as opposed to belonging to some broader category of prudential norms? (ii) If doxastic norms and zetetic norms are both epistemic norms\, which is more fundamental? Can we derive one set of norms from the other? Or (iii) should we be open to the possibility that they might be mutually irreducible and independent\, so that they might well generate incompatible obligations in context? \nIn this talk\, I offer some reasons to think that this dialectic is misguided. It is true that we sometimes criticize epistemic agents for the inferences they draw from the evidence currently at their disposal. Likewise\, it is true that we sometimes criticize them for their failure to gather more evidence\, where such evidence is there to be had. What doesn’t follow is that we are always (or even typically) invoking distinct norms in articulating these criticisms. \nTo support this claim\, I will present examples suggesting that in a large (and representative) range of cases — spanning science\, policy decisions\, and everyday life –\, what we should believe on our current evidence is importantly indeterminate: in order to settle which hypothesis our current evidence supports we require more evidence\, evidence which we could only gain by engaging in further inquiry. But on the other hand\, we could never know what sort of inquiry we thereby ought to engage in unless we also had a reasonably clear sense of what epistemic possibilities our current evidence leaves open and what it forecloses. I conclude that from the point of view of epistemic normativity\, the doxastic and zetetic perspectives are complementary\, mutually dependent\, and equally fundamental. \nSanford Goldberg. The norms of inquiry and the demands of conversation \nIn this paper I want to revisit Stalnaker’s (1978; 2002) Common Ground (CG) model as a way of thinking about inquiry.  While the CG is standardly used to model information updates in the course of (conversations about) inquiry\, my aim is to show how we can use the CG to model how the norms of inquiry bear on epistemic assessment.  I pursue this aim by developing several ideas regarding the CG.  Among these ideas I highlight the following: (1) there are types of conversation (Green 2017) which are such that participants are properly expected to presuppose certain things throughout the conversation (I call these the conversation’s “normative presuppositions”); (2) some inquiries are such that there is a corresponding conversation-type associated with them (throughout the period of inquiring); (3) for some social (or institutional) roles\, subjects who occupy these roles are properly expected to participate in certain conversations (including some associated with inquiries); (4) assertions made in the context of inquiry answer to an epistemic standard; and (5) assertions that contradict\, or are in tension with\, the conversation’s normative presuppositions are presumptively criticizable.  In this way\, I hope to show that there are types of inquiry for which the CG model enables us to capture our answerability to the norms of inquiry themselves and to the widely-accepted results thereby attained. \nJoshua Habgood-Coote. Bad Questions.  \nThis paper is about questions which are bad as questions\, in the sense that pursuing them will impede progress in inquiry. It seeks to do three things. First\, to gather examples of question critique: criticisms of views based not on their claims or arguments\, but the questions they ask. Second to give an account of the function of questions which sheds light on the varieties of bad question. And thirdly\, to provide us with a sound normative basis on which to undertake question critique.  \nChris Kelp. Inquiry and Epistemic Psychology \nThis paper proposes an account of epistemic psychological attitudes (such as belief\, credences\, suspension\, etc.) according to which they are types of moves in inquiry that have their own constitutive aims. I zoom in on belief and show how the account I developed in Inquiry\, Knowledge\, and Understanding can deal with a range of objections that have been raised in recent literature. The remainder of the paper takes a closer look at an alternative view of the relation between inquiry and epistemic psychology\, developed in recent work by Jane Friedman and provides reason to think that my account compares favourably with Friedman’s. \nJulia Staffel. Are there transitional beliefs? – I think so? \nA question that has gathered much interest in epistemology recently is whether it can ever be rational to keep inquiring into a question once one has adopted a belief that answers it. Friedman (2019) has prominently argued for a negative answer to this question. \nI am interested in a related\, but slightly different question here\, which has not gathered any attention\, but will help us better understand the nature of belief and its relation to inquiry and deliberation: Is it ever rationally permissible to believe something prior to concluding one’s deliberation? My question differs from the more commonly discussed one\, insofar as it asks about the rationality of believing that p before settling on p as the answer to some question Q\, while the commonly discussed one asks about the rationality of continuing to inquire into Q after coming to believe that p is the answer to Q. \nI will argue that it is possible for rational agents to hold beliefs of a certain kind\, which I call transitional beliefs\, prior to settling on an answer to a question. Further\, I will show that many common claims about what beliefs are don’t identify important features of belief itself\, but of attitudes that are held as conclusions of deliberations more generally. \nElise Woodard. How to Change Your Mind \nIf realists are more likely to become anti-realists than vice versa\, is that evidence that anti-realism is true? I argue that the answer is yes. When more people move from view A to B than B to A\, this is defeasible evidence that B is more likely correct than A. This idea\, which I refer to as “Migration as Evidence\,” suggests that widespread changes in belief could be meaningful indicators of truth. This approach has two main benefits. First\, it provides an additional tool for forming opinions on complex and controversial issues in areas like philosophy\, politics\, and religion\, where even experts disagree. Second\, it encourages a culture where changing one’s mind is more openly shared and less socially penalized\, fostering an environment where the pursuit of truth is prioritized over consistency. If correct\, “Migration as Evidence” highlights a valuable yet overlooked source of information when inquiring about complex and contentious issues. \n  \n 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/the-epistemology-of-inquiry/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/questions-5665629_1280.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240521T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240521T140000
DTSTAMP:20240507T173318Z
CREATED:20240507T173154Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240507T173318Z
UID:10018925-1716292800-1716300000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Suzuka Komatsu (University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Depression and the Open Future\nAbstract: We intuitively think that the past is fixed or closed whereas the future is open. In a phenomenological description of depression\, however\, depressed subjects often report that the future is closed. Our naïve view of the open future thus seems to be impaired. What makes the depressed subjects to represent the future to be closed? I argue that depressed subject come to have a psychological orientation towards certain ontological views related to the openness of the future. To argue this\, I examine four candidate ontological views: presentism\, the growing block theory\, the block theory\, and the branch theory. I argue that the seeming lack of asymmetry is caused by depressed subjects’ psychological orientation towards either presentism\, the growing block theory\, or the block theory. This tells us\, when we represent the future to be open\, we are implicitly committed to the branch theory.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-32/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240521T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240521T170000
DTSTAMP:20240516T112459Z
CREATED:20240408T102507Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240516T112459Z
UID:10018991-1716303600-1716310800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar - Lorna Finlayson (Essex)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Are kids oppressed? Child liberation beyond equal rights \nAbstract: Thinking about childhood often has a paradoxical quality. Children and young people are at once idealised and demonised. Childhood is romanticised in memory and imagination at the same time as it is the receptacle for our deepest traumas. The idea of children as an oppressed group is subject to a similar tension. On the face of it\, the social situation of childhood (in most or all historical and present societies) satisfies most or all of the criteria normally treated as indicative of oppression: children are involuntarily members of a group which is subject to pervasive formal and informal discrimination\, segregation\, confinement and also\, disproportionately\, to all forms of violence (physical\, sexual\, economic). At the same time\, the idea that children qua children constitute an oppressed group is almost universally regarded as laughable (when it is contemplated at all). The subordination and control of children\, it is argued\, really is ‘for their own good’ (whereas the same claim\, where it has been made in the case of e.g. women and colonised peoples\, has been false). Children\, it is argued\, are different from adults in ways that justify this subordination and control – being\, for example\, irrational\, emotional\, and naturally dependent on others to identify and secure their best interests. I will not contest the obvious truth that there are significant differences between adults and children (and that these differences themselves differ from the differences that obtain between other groups such as men and women). I will argue\, however\, that the claim that children are oppressed does not rely on the denial of this truth. The claim of oppression is a claim about what a given power structure does to those who are subject to it\, namely that it restricts them in ways that are to their detriment and\, in some sense\, to the benefit of a dominant group. I will suggest that this claim\, applied to the social structures that regulate childhood (the actual ones\, at least\, rather than some hypothetical ones) is highly plausible. If this is correct\, then it follows that children stand in need of liberation from that oppression. Child liberationists\, whose influence peaked in the 1970s\, have typically framed the demand for the liberation in terms of ‘equal rights’. As a former child-child-liberationist with enduring sympathies in that direction\, I will argue that the apparatus of (equal) ‘rights’ is not the most promising vehicle for a liberationist project\, and that if we are interested in understanding and countering the oppression of children\, we would do well to look beyond it.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-12-6/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240522T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240522T170000
DTSTAMP:20240516T100921Z
CREATED:20240327T151725Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240516T100921Z
UID:10018859-1716390000-1716397200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Matteo Nizzardo (University of St Andrews and University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Reference Without Identity \nAbstract: Singular reference to non-individuals is often thought to be impossible. At present\, however\, this claim rests solely on intuitions. In this paper\, I present four arguments in favour of the impossibility of singular reference to non-individuals.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-19-9/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T120000
DTSTAMP:20240519T172652Z
CREATED:20240328T173751Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240519T172652Z
UID:10019050-1716458400-1716465600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar: Kit Fine (NYU)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Numerical and Mereological Indeterminacy.\nAbstract:This talk has two aims\, one negative and the other positive.  The negative aim is to argue against the possibility of numerical or mereological indeterminacy by showing how the arguments given by Sider and Lewis can be modified so as to be resistant to the objections that might reasonably be leveled against them.  However\, these arguments presuppose a ‘localist’ conception of vagueness\, under which the notion of a borderline case\, or of determinate truth\, is taken to be meaningful.  I have elsewhere proposed a globalist conception of vagueness (Fine [2020])\, under which indeterminacy is essentially a global rather than a local phenomenon.  The positive aim is to argue for the possibility of numerical and mereological indeterminacy once the localist framework is given up in favor of a globalist framework.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-3-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T143000
DTSTAMP:20240320T133929Z
CREATED:20240320T133929Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240320T133929Z
UID:10018779-1716469200-1716474600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: CANCELLED
DESCRIPTION:Regular meeting is cancelled. Instead\, the stream will host a workshop: \nThe Epistemology of Inquiry
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-7-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T170000
DTSTAMP:20240327T132454Z
CREATED:20240320T135401Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240327T132454Z
UID:10018844-1716476400-1716483600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity Pre-Reading: Prototypes
DESCRIPTION:Belastegui\, Javier (2022). ‘A Qualitative Approach to Conceptual Spaces: Prototypes as Qualitative Atoms.’ Erkenntnis (Online):1-36.\nhttps://philpapers.org/rec/BELAQA-2
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/unity-pre-reading-prototypes/
LOCATION:Arché Seminar Room\, 17-19 College Street\, St Andrews\, KY169AL
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
GEO:56.3408615;-2.7948441
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=Arché Seminar Room 17-19 College Street St Andrews KY169AL;X-APPLE-RADIUS=500;X-TITLE=17-19 College Street:geo:-2.7948441,56.3408615
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240528T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240528T140000
DTSTAMP:20240523T095859Z
CREATED:20240523T095817Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240523T095859Z
UID:10018926-1716897600-1716904800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Louise Richardson (University of York)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Regret \nAbstract: There are many ways to feel bad about things. This paper is about which of those ways of feeling bad count as regret\, and why. I will suggest that a very great deal of our bad feelings are regrets\, in opposition to the narrower view of some philosophers and psychologists who restrict the scope of the regrettable to our past mistakes. As well as defending this expansive conception of what we may regret (regret’s object) I will present a hypothesis about the structure of regret which allows us to understand it as a unitary phenomenon\, despite the varied ways in which it can manifest in our emotional lives. On this hypothesis\, regret is (in a certain\, unorthodox\, sense) a basic human emotion.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-33/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240528T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240528T170000
DTSTAMP:20240524T124144Z
CREATED:20240408T102646Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240524T124144Z
UID:10018992-1716908400-1716915600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar - NO SESSION
DESCRIPTION:There will be no session this week as it conflicts with an amazing workshop on climate ethics. Please join us there: http://stacees.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/05/Climate-Week-Conference-Schedule-%E2%80%93-May-2024-%E2%80%93-DU49273.pdf \nThis event is part of the Inaugural St Andrews Climate Week: https://stacees.ac.uk/university-of-st-andrews-climate-week/
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-12-7/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T170000
DTSTAMP:20240516T101102Z
CREATED:20240327T151857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240516T101102Z
UID:10018860-1716994800-1717002000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Hannes Leitgeb (MCMP)
DESCRIPTION:Title: When Rules Define Logical Operators: Rules as Second-Order Definitions \nAbstract: Logical inferentialists hold that the meaning of logical operators is given by their rules of inference. Arthur Prior cast doubt on this by introducing rules for his so-called tonk operator that seemed to allow for the derivation of any sentence whatsoever from any sentence whatsoever. The obvious inferentialist reply was to require constraints on the defining rules\, such as conservativeness (Belnap) or harmony (Dummett). In my talk\, I will propose a different criterion for when rules define logical operators that (i) is philosophically principled in taking the idea of rules as definitions perfectly seriously\, (ii) explains how the semantic meaning of the operators can be determined from their rules\, (iii) is local in a similar sense as harmony is\, (iv) validates the intuitionistic natural deduction rules and the intuitionistic/classical sequent calculus rules as defining the classical logical operators while ruling out Prior’s rules for tonk\, (v) makes clear why already the intuitionistic natural deduction rules define the classical meaning of logical operators so long as metavariables are interpreted as expressing arbitrary classical propositions\, (vi) validates the classical natural deduction rules as analytic\, and (vii) does not guarantee conservativeness in Belnap’s sense but in a closely related one that still entails consistency. The basic idea will be: rules define a classical logical operator just in case they translate into an explicit definition in pure classical second-order logic.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-19-10/
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240530
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240601
DTSTAMP:20250114T142551Z
CREATED:20240226T142205Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250114T142551Z
UID:10018768-1717059600-1717145999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysical Explanation Workshop
DESCRIPTION:The University of St Andrews Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics and Epistemology will be hosting a workshop on Metaphysical Explanation.\n \nDescription: The purpose of the workshop is to bring together and promote research in the nature of metaphysical explanation\, exploring what it is and how it works. In addition\, the workshop seeks to explore the applications of metaphysical explanation to issues in metaphysics and related issues in analytic philosophy.\n \nSpeakers: Naomi Thompson (University of Bristol)\, Jessica Wilson (University of Toronto)\, Boris Kment (Princeton University)\, and Ross Cameron (University of Virginia).\n \nDATE AND VENUE: 30 May 2024\, Online on Teams.\n \nREGISTER HERE: https://forms.gle/JoSwMCx1edkzPW7N9\n \nPROVISIONAL SCHEDULE (Note: All times are in British Summer Time):\nEvery time slot includes: the main talk (45 mins)\, a commentary and reply (15 mins) and Q&A (15 mins).\n\n \n\n11:55 – 12:00 Preliminary Remarks \n12:00 – 13:15 Naomi Thompson: “Social Metaphysical Explanation”; Commentator: Jade Fletcher \n13:15 – 13:30 Break \n13:30 – 14:45 Boris Kment: “Ground and Paradox”; Commentator: Giulia Schirripa \n14:45 – 15:00 Break \n15:00 – 16:15 Ross Cameron: “Explanation and Plenitude in Non-Well-Founded Set Theories”; Commentator: Sabina Dominguez Parrado \n16:15 – 16:30 Break \n16:30 – 17:45 Jessica Wilson: “Metaphysical Skepticism\, Relativized Metaphysical Modality\, and Moderate Modal Naturalism”; Commentator: Luca Alberto Rappuoli \n\n\n \nTITLES AND ABSTRACTS\n\n \nTitle: Social Metaphysical Explanation (Naomi Thompson)\nAbstract: This paper argues that grounding and metaphysical explanation as they are ordinarily conceived are ill-suited to modelling the social world. Social facts are neither necessitated nor generated by their full grounds\, and there are good reasons to think of social metaphysical explanations as non-factive. Where grounding and metaphysical explanation are generally taken to form strict partial orders\, social metaphysical explanations are plausibly holistic. Social metaphysical explanation occurs in a context\, and it requires that in that context\, a social fact be represented as being determined on the basis of further facts\, and that concepts corresponding to social kinds featuring in the social fact to be explained are salient in that context\n\n \n\n\nTitle: Ground and Paradox (Boris Kment)\nAbstract: At the beginning of the 20th century\, Betrand Russell discovered a cluster of paradoxes that showed that certain initially very appealing principles of plenitude and individuation for sets\, properties\, and propositions are classically inconsistent. The search for a plausible\, unified\, and independently motivated solution has met with only limited success. I argue that recent ideas in the theory of grounding yield a new and promising approach. A ground-theoretic analysis of the Russellian paradoxes shows that they rest on assumptions that should be rejected because they violate a plausible non-circularity constraint on grounding. In some of the paradoxes\, the problematic assumption is a principle of plenitude. These paradoxes should be resolved by restrictions on our ontology. In the remaining paradoxes\, the assumption to be abandoned is an instance of the Law of Excluded Middle. The failure of Excluded Middle reflects the fact that reality is incomplete\, in the sense that some questions cannot be answered. We can settle such questions only by ruling out every possible answer.\n\n \n\n\nTitle: Explanation and Plenitude in Non-Well-Founded Set Theories (Ross Cameron)\nAbstract: Non-well-founded set theories allow set-theoretic exotica that standard ZFC will not allow\, such as a set that has itself as its sole member. We can distinguish plenitudinous non-well-founded set theories\, such as Boffa set theory\, that allow infinitely many such sets\, from restrictive theories\, such as Finsler-Aczel or AFA\, that allow exactly one. Plenitudinous non-well-founded set theories face a puzzle: nothing seems to explain the identity or distinctness of various of the sets they countenance. In this paper I aim to sharpen this puzzle\, make clear who it does and does not apply to and\, ultimately\, to argue in favor of a plenitudinous theory like Boffa.\n\n\n \n\nTitle: Metaphysical Skepticism\, Relativized Metaphysical Modality\, and Moderate Modal Naturalism (Jessica Wilson)\nAbstract: One route to skepticism about metaphysics (drawing on Rosen 2006\, Chalmers 2009\, Clarke-Doane 2019) proceeds by observing the following tension. On the one hand\, metaphysical claims are supposed to be metaphysically necessary; for example\, if Platonic universals are the metaphysical basis for resemblance between objects\, then this is supposed to be necessarily so. But on the other hand\, the operative modal epistemologies seem to offer support for the possibility of incompatible metaphysical claims; for example\, it seems conceivable both that Platonic universals might be the basis for resemblance between objects\, and also conceivable that tropes might be such a basis. Here I consider two strategies of response. The first—resistance—maintains that a better modal epistemology\, based in abduction (IBE) as opposed to conceiving and the like\, might justify one metaphysical claim over others (per Biggs and Wilson 2018\, 2020). The second strategy — accommodation — appeals to Relativized Metaphysical Modality\, or RMM (Murray and Wilson 2012; Hellie\, Murray\, and Wilson 2020)\, according to which what is possible or necessary may depend on facts about how the world actually is. RMM makes room for just one of a set of competing metaphysical claims to be true and hence metaphysically necessary\, while at the same time explaining intuitions that competing metaphysical claims are possible\, as reflecting (mere) speculative consideration of what would be possible or necessary against the backdrop assumption that a different world is actual. This strategy can be seen as expanding the application of Kripke’s notion of necessary a posteriori truths beyond the standard natural kind expressions to general metaphysical claims.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysical-explanation/
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/41DEDBAF-C95D-44BE-955C-806AAE2613A4.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T120000
DTSTAMP:20240529T144004Z
CREATED:20240529T144003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240529T144004Z
UID:10019058-1717063200-1717070400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-3-3/2024-05-30/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T143000
DTSTAMP:20240320T133715Z
CREATED:20240320T133714Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240320T133715Z
UID:10018780-1717074000-1717079400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: CANCELLED
DESCRIPTION:Cancelled due to conflicting event \nSymposium on Jessia Brown’s Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents (OUP) \nCogito Research Centre\, University of Glasgow\, May 27-28th.\nAll ECT members are welcome to attend\, but will need to cover expenses (i.e.\, food and travel) themselves.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-7-10/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T170000
DTSTAMP:20240321T135713Z
CREATED:20240321T135713Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240321T135713Z
UID:10018851-1717081200-1717088400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity: No Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/unity-no-seminar-2/
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR