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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230601T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230601T120000
DTSTAMP:20230111T164225Z
CREATED:20230111T164225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230111T164225Z
UID:10018297-1685613600-1685620800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SS Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/ss-seminar/2023-06-01/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230601T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230601T143000
DTSTAMP:20230518T093858Z
CREATED:20230403T104256Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230518T093858Z
UID:10018593-1685624400-1685629800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Roy Sorensen (UT Austin / St Andrews) "Your First Lie Targeted Knowledge Rather Than Belief"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: According to knowledge-first psychology\, you had the concept of knowledge before you had the concept of belief. During this knowledge-only stage\, your beginning speech sufficed for testimony. Your ability to assert presented an opportunity to thwart the testimony of others. When the tattle-tale told your mother that p\, you denied p. Simple denial often suffices to prevent punishment. This negative reinforcement of insincere denials leads to more lying. Alas\, you were soon caught by a higher mind. Later\, you\, too\, acquired the concept of belief. This helped you predict and manipulate action on the basis of belief and desire – and lower the risk of your lies being detected. Just as walking does not entirely displace crawling\, knowledge-lies continue to be deployed in circumstances in which belief-lies are overkill. Recognizing knowledge-lies in adults is more difficult because sophisticated sabotage of knowledge could so easily be understood as subtle belief-lies. Thus knowledge-first psychology provides pure specimens – such as yourself as a child.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar-xintong-wei-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230605T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230605T110000
DTSTAMP:20230508T101413Z
CREATED:20221025T081119Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230508T101413Z
UID:10017820-1685957400-1685962800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Obligationes
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-3/2023-06-05/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230605T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230605T170000
DTSTAMP:20230531T144847Z
CREATED:20230531T144847Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230531T144847Z
UID:10017835-1685977200-1685984400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Frederik Andersen (University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Burning Bridges? Rationality’s Fixpoint and Disagreements about Logic  \nAbstract: This draft has two main components. First\, it clarifies and discusses Michael G. Titelbaum’s controversial Fixed Point Thesis\, which is a theme in several debates of contemporary epistemology including the debates on peer disagreement\, epistemic akrasia\, and higher-order evidence. Second\, it relates the initial discussion of Titelbaum’s thesis to the topic of Logical Disagreement in general and disagreements concerning bridge principles in particular. Eventually it’s argued that the epistemological repercussions of accepting the Fixed Point Thesis are so severe that the thesis must be rejected even if this means that states of epistemic akrasia can sometimes be rational
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-4-9/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230606
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230608
DTSTAMP:20231103T112657Z
CREATED:20220729T084928Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231103T112657Z
UID:10017803-1686042000-1686128399@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Lies without Assertions Workshop
DESCRIPTION:Lying requires that a person makes a statement\, but does it require assertion? This last thesis has been recently challenged. It has been argued that speakers can lie with presuppositions (Viebahn 2019)\, promises (Marsili 2016)\, and arguments (Sorensen 2017). Questioning the relation between lies and assertion raises further questions: should we capture in one theoretical category all and only cases we pre-theoretically call ‘lies’? How should we draw the distinction between lying and other kinds of deception such as misleading? What can the nature of lying tell us about the relation between assertion and other speech acts? \nIf you wish to attend (either in person or online)\, please register by sending an email at vt27@st-andrews.ac.uk. \n(Abstracts and Schedule below.) \nThe workshop will be held in the Arts Building\, Room 115 \nSpeakers:\n• Roy Sorensen (University of Texas at Austin/University of St Andrews)\n• Andreas Stokke (Uppsala University)\n• Jessica Pepp (Uppsala University)\n• Neri Marsili (University of Barcelona)\n• Emanuel Viebahn (Humboldt-Universität/Freie Universität\, Berlin) \n \nSchedule \n9.00-9.15 – Welcome & Coffee\n9.15-10.30 – Roy Sorensen (UT Austin / St Andrews) – “Fichte’s World of Wordless Lies”\n10.30-10.45 – Break\n10.45-12.00 – Jessica Pepp (Uppsala Universitet) – “Commitments and Lies\, With or Without Assertion”\n12.00-12.15 – Break\n12.15-13.30 – Emanuel Viebahn (Freie Universität Berlin) – “Telling stories\, telling lies”\n13.30-15.00 – Lunch\n15.00-16.15 – Neri Marsili (UNED Madrid) – “Lying: some insights from speech act theory”\n16.15-16.30 – Break\n16.30-17.45 – Andreas Stokke (Uppsala Universitet) – “Speaking for Someone Else: Group Lies and Self-Less Assertions”\n__________\n\nCommitments and Lies\, With or Without Assertion – Jessica Pepp \nLying and assertion seem to be closely connected. Many philosophers have agreed (details aside) that to lie is to assert something one takes to be false (or\, at least\, not true). What\, then\, to make of cases in which someone seems to lie without asserting anything they believe to be false/untrue? For instance\, what should one say about cases in which people seem to lie about something by presupposing it\, or by implying it? Three options are immediately on the table\, for any given case of putative lying without assertion: (i) reject the judgment that it is a case of lying (perhaps arguing that it is instead a case of misleading)\, (ii) reject the judgment that the content of the lie is not asserted\, (iii) revise the definition of lying so as not to require the content of a lie to be asserted. A fourth option is to accept the judgment that the case is a case of lying and to become (somewhat) quiet about assertion. One can then define lying without appealing to the notion of assertion\, by incorporating elements from accounts of assertion in such a way that the putatively non-assertive lie falls under the definition. If the resultant definition of lying proves robust\, it is then a further question what this should tell us about the nature of assertion. \nThe paper-in-progress on which this talk is based is a collaboration between one author who has pursued the fourth strategy just mentioned\, drawing on so-called “commitment accounts” of assertion (Viebahn 2021) and one author who is favourable to the strategy but critical of the specifics of Viebahn’s approach (Pepp 2022). We aim to pursue the strategy further by addressing two related questions. First\, what is the nature of the commitment that partly constitutes lying and sets it apart from misleading—what does it mean\, in this context\, to commit oneself to something’s being the case? Second\, what are the grounds of that commitment—what makes it the case that someone has taken on such a commitment?  \nIn this talk\, I suggest that the relevant commitment is a commitment to accept certain attributions of belief to oneself. I argue against proposals on which this commitment is grounded in epistemic factors\, such as how sure a hearer can be of what one has communicated. I explore an alternative proposal on which the commitment is grounded in expectations that partly constitute speakers’ participation in the joint activity of having a conversation. \n  \nSpeaking for Someone Else: Group Lies and Self-Less Assertions – Andreas Stokke \nThis talk compares cases of so-called “selfless assertions” with lies told by groups such as corporations or political parties. I argue that there are differences\, even though both involve speakers making assertions on behalf of someone else. I draw some conclusions concerning how to understand the involvement of the speaker’s attitudes in such cases. \n  \nTelling stories\, telling lies – Emanuel Viebahn \nIt is widely held that authors cannot lie in producing works of fiction: either you tell a story\, or you tell a lie. The first aim of this talk is to challenge this consensus. I will point to various cases in which authors should count as lying in telling stories. The second aim of the talk is to explore whether this suggests that it is possible to lie without asserting. \n  \nFichte’s World of Wordless Lies – Roy Sorensen \nImmanuel Kant was a moderate about lying! True\, he enlists among the battalion of never-liars. But Kant cushions `Never lie’ with a flexible weave of old and new distinctions. The true extremist about lying is Kant’s first German interpreter. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762 – 1814) disintegrates the distinctions designed to make `Never lie’ practical: lying/misleading\, discursive/pictorial representation\, commission/omission\, honesty/candor. Whereas Kant restricts lies to declarations (assertions and promises)\, Fichte counts the failure to correct an error as a lie. Contrary to Kant\, we all have a duty to perfect each other. We must prevent and correct error because false belief undermines free action. Any intentional deception\, verbal or non-verbal\, is therefore a lie. By Fichte’s reckoning\, Kant lied by wearing a wig. Kant overcame the temptation to save an innocent man from murder by lying. Fichte is mortified. Even to have considered lying was one thought too many! \n  \nLying: some insights from speech act theory – Neri Marsili \nThis talk revisits some traditional questions in the philosophy of lying through the lens of speech act theory – including whether lying always involves an attempt to deceive\, whether it is possible to lie without making an assertion\, and whether making a believed-true statement can constitute lying. The emerging picture offers a fresh perspective on the nature of lying\, shining new light on long-standing philosophical debates. \n 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/lying-without-assertion-workshop/
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230606T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230606T140000
DTSTAMP:20230404T134908Z
CREATED:20230404T134255Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230404T134908Z
UID:10018047-1686052800-1686060000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-4/2023-06-06/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230607T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230607T180000
DTSTAMP:20230413T104137Z
CREATED:20230413T095053Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230413T104137Z
UID:10018619-1686153600-1686160800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosphy-and-social-theory-2/2023-06-07/
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230608T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230608T120000
DTSTAMP:20230111T164225Z
CREATED:20230111T164225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230111T164225Z
UID:10018298-1686218400-1686225600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SS Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/ss-seminar/2023-06-08/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230608T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230608T143000
DTSTAMP:20230605T131324Z
CREATED:20230403T104338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230605T131324Z
UID:10018594-1686229200-1686234600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Miriam Bowen (St Andrews) "Degrees of Belief and Neutral Attitudes"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Suspended judgment is a neutral attitude an agent can have towards a proposition. In the context of a traditional belief framework where an agent has belief or disbelief it seems natural to include the attitude of suspended judgement or at least withholding belief or disbelief. In this talk\, I will examine how we ought to understand suspended judgment and give an account of how suspended judgment should be understood in the context of degrees of belief. In particular\, I argue that suspended judgment should not be understood as having credence 0.5 since this fails to capture the neutrality of the attitude. \nI argue that suspended judgment should instead be understood as having imprecise credences. A version of this view has been offered by van Fraassen (1998). I show that his view also fails to capture the neutrality of suspended judgment but that by amending his view we can give conditions on the form and interpretation of imprecise credences that do capture suspended judgment in a credal framework.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar-miriam-bowen-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230612T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230612T110000
DTSTAMP:20230508T101413Z
CREATED:20221025T081119Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230508T101413Z
UID:10017821-1686562200-1686567600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Obligationes
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-3/2023-06-12/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230612T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230612T170000
DTSTAMP:20230608T114754Z
CREATED:20230608T114753Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230608T114754Z
UID:10017836-1686582000-1686589200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Viviane Fairbank (University of St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism about Logical Inference \nIs there a special relationship between logic and reasoning? Some people think there is in virtue of the fact that reasoners often perform so-called logical inferences—i.e\, deductive inferences that are somehow governed by logical principles. How to make sense of inferences of this kind\, however\, is not so clear. In this talk\, I focus on one puzzle regarding logical inference\, known as the Adoption Problem. The Adoption Problem says that if someone does not already use certain fundamental logical principles in their reasoning\, then they cannot rationally begin to do so\, because beginning to use these principles requires that one already be using them; hence\, the adoption of these principles by any individual is either unnecessary or impossible. This is meant to be a problem for anyone who thinks that logical-inferential habits are subject to rational evaluation and revision. After reconstructing the argument for the Adoption Problem and providing an overview of recent responses in the literature\, I show that the puzzle is in fact a useful tool for making explicit different philosophers’ views on logical inference\, which are usually left implicit. I propose a classification of different responses to the Adoption Problem as either cognitivist or non-cognitivist about logical inference. This classification\, I argue\, allows us to understand the fundamental issues surrounding the nature of logical inference more clearly. In the final section of the talk\, I present an argument against cognitivism about logical inference—and inference more generally—and I suggest that a species of rationalist non-cognitivism about Iogical inference is likely the most fruitful view to pursue.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-4-10/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230613T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230613T140000
DTSTAMP:20230612T095043Z
CREATED:20230612T095020Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230612T095043Z
UID:10018048-1686657600-1686664800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Natalia Waights Hickman (Oxford) Semantic normativity and illusions of sense
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-4-9/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230614T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230614T180000
DTSTAMP:20230612T101244Z
CREATED:20230612T100503Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230612T101244Z
UID:10018620-1686758400-1686765600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory: Lynne Tirrell (Connecticut) Not a Conversation: Hit-and-Run Speech Acts
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: A random stranger approaches you as you wait for a train\, and makes a comment about your body or attire\, and walks away. Call this a hit-and-run encounter. Such encounters are common on social media like Twitter\, with its open platform\, searchable hashtags\, and potential for lurking\, mobbing\, and flooding. Online hit-and-run speech is all about impact without speaker responsibility. On most accounts of language (Austin\, Brandom\, Grice\, Lewis\, others)\, speakers undertake responsibility when they speak\, but hit-and-run online speech tends to evade such responsibilities. Anonymity makes such evasion easy\, but the rapid pace of most social media platforms\, the sheer speed of transmission\, combined with the flood of transmissions\, creates challenges for holding speakers to account for their utterances. This paper addresses questions of responsibility for speech online\, with an emphasis on hit-and-run cases\, contrasting them with non-anonymous chat spaces that are more like IRL conversations. Tracking speaker and hearer responsibilities in these different contexts will offer insights about the fraught issue of online counter-speech.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosphy-and-social-theory-2-8/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230615T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230615T120000
DTSTAMP:20230111T164225Z
CREATED:20230111T164225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230111T164225Z
UID:10018299-1686823200-1686830400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SS Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/ss-seminar/2023-06-15/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230615T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230615T143000
DTSTAMP:20230613T064214Z
CREATED:20230403T104420Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230613T064214Z
UID:10018595-1686834000-1686839400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern/St Andrews) "Some initial reflections on epistemology’s Road Sign Problem"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract:  \nIn this paper I present a problem for a certain very traditional conception of epistemology.   According to this traditional conception\, the epistemic status of one’s doxastic state – belief\, disbelief\, agnosticism – is determined by factors that are limited to (i) one’s current evidence/corpus of beliefs and/or (ii) one’s currently available cognitive processes (together with their reliability score).  I argue that any epistemology that embraces this conception faces what I call the “road sign problem.”   This problem arises when we recognize the possibility that what a road sign enjoins us to do – for example\, (in the US) refrain from turning right on red – is something regarding which we might have all sorts of relevant evidence.  The difficulty is that even if we have overwhelming evidence that p (e.g. that there is no car coming now)\, acting on the assumption that p would not excuse us if\, having violated the road sign’s injunction\, we were to cause an accident.  This is so even if the assumption that p is overwhelmingly supported by our total evidence (and by any information we might acquire by relying at the moment on our available cognitive processes).  I hope to use this example to provide yet more evidence that sometimes the epistemic evaluation of a person’s doxastic state appeals to things that we properly expect them to have done (whether or not they did them) – that is\, by appeal to things that go beyond (i) and (ii).
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar-sanford-goldberg-northwestern-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230619T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230619T110000
DTSTAMP:20230508T101413Z
CREATED:20221025T081119Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230508T101413Z
UID:10017822-1687167000-1687172400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Obligationes
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-3/2023-06-19/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230619T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230619T170000
DTSTAMP:20230614T122004Z
CREATED:20230614T122004Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230614T122004Z
UID:10017837-1687186800-1687194000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Huw Price (University of Bonn and University of Cambridge)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Why entanglement? \nAbstract: In this piece\, written for a general audience\, we propose a mechanism for quantum entanglement. The key ingredient is the familiar statistical phenomenon of collider bias\, or Berkson’s bias. In the language of causal models\, a collider is a variable causally influenced by two or more other variables. Conditioning on a collider typically produces non-causal associations between its contributing causes\, even if they are actually independent. It is easy to show that this phenomenon can produce associations analogous to Bell correlations\, in suitable post-selected ensembles. It is also straightforward that such collider artefacts may become real connections\, resembling causality\, if a collider is ‘constrained’ (e.g.\, by a future boundary condition). We consider the time-reversed analogues of these points in the context of retrocausal models of QM. Retrocausality yields a collider at the source of an EPR-Bell particle pair\, and in this case constraint of the collider is possible by normal methods of experimental preparation. It follows that connections resembling causality may be expected to emerge across such colliders\, from one branch of the experiment to the other. Our hypothesis is that this constrained retrocausal collider bias is the origin of entanglement.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-4-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230620T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230620T140000
DTSTAMP:20230619T083648Z
CREATED:20230619T083647Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230619T083648Z
UID:10018049-1687262400-1687269600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Lixiao Lin How to use true evaluative sentences to lie
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-4-10/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230621T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230621T180000
DTSTAMP:20230619T083858Z
CREATED:20230619T083857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230619T083858Z
UID:10018621-1687363200-1687370400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory: tbc
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosphy-and-social-theory-2-9/
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230622T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230622T120000
DTSTAMP:20230111T164225Z
CREATED:20230111T164225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230111T164225Z
UID:10018300-1687428000-1687435200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SS Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/ss-seminar/2023-06-22/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230622T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230622T143000
DTSTAMP:20230526T114107Z
CREATED:20221025T084455Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230526T114107Z
UID:10018036-1687438800-1687444200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Matthew McGrath (Washington University St Louis) "Do Epistemic Norms have Positive Critical Power?"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Epistemic norms have negative critical power\, let’s say\, iff there are cases in which an agent has a doxastic attitude but\, according to epistemic norms\, shouldn’t have it. They have positive critical power iff there are cases in which an agent lacks a doxastic attitude but\, according to the norms\, should have it. \nMost epistemologists readily accept that epistemic norms have negative critical power\, and I assume as much in this talk. For instance\, there are cases in which someone believes p\, but because they have counterevidence against p\, epistemically shouldn’t believe p. But it is a matter of controversy whether agents ever epistemically should have beliefs they lack\, or even should have particular beliefs at all. Some philosophers\, e.g.\, Mark Nelson\, Earl Conee and Richard Feldman\, argue that epistemic norms are merely permissive and do not tell us to believe particular propositions. \nI argue that in a range of paradigm cases in which one epistemically shouldn’t have certain beliefs which one has are also cases in which one epistemically should have beliefs which one lacks\, namely those beliefs that comprise parts of the “route” to the abandonment of the belief one shouldn’t have. Thus\, we see that epistemic norms must have positive critical power if they are to have the negative critical power they plausibly have. \nHaving argued that epistemic norms have positive critical power\, I explore other sorts of cases in which\, plausibly\, we epistemically should hold a particular belief. \nI finally consider possible explanations of the source of the positive critical power of epistemic norms.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230626T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230626T110000
DTSTAMP:20230508T101413Z
CREATED:20221025T081119Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230508T101413Z
UID:10017823-1687771800-1687777200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Obligationes
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-3/2023-06-26/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230626T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230626T170000
DTSTAMP:20230626T084411Z
CREATED:20230626T084358Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230626T084411Z
UID:10017838-1687791600-1687798800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Michaela McSweeney (Boston) Social Structural Objects
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-4-12/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230627T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230627T150000
DTSTAMP:20230626T074455Z
CREATED:20230626T073006Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230626T074455Z
UID:10018050-1687870800-1687878000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Eduardo Garcia Ramirez (UNAM-UBA) What Are Names?
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-10-4-11/
LOCATION:Online via Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230628T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230628T180000
DTSTAMP:20230626T084937Z
CREATED:20230626T073751Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230626T084937Z
UID:10018622-1687968000-1687975200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory: Cael Keegan How to Do Things with Trans
DESCRIPTION:Title: How to Do Things with Trans\nAbstract:\nWhat is the conceptual formation trans\, and what can it do? While transgender studies is oriented against providing definitive answers\, the field does possess a history and an emergent set of critical tools\, both similar to and yet divergent from the more institutionally embraced field of queer studies. Drawing on Susan Stryker’s characterization of transgender studies as queer theory’s “evil twin\,” this talk explores the critical relation enacted between the two fields: Rather than envisioning them as opposites\, it explores their relation as a fruitful paradox in which each discourse problematizes and yet enlivens the other’s claims. It then demonstrates trans analytics through a reading of John Carpenter’s The Thing (1982).
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosphy-and-social-theory-2-10/
LOCATION:Online via Teams
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230629T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230629T120000
DTSTAMP:20230111T164225Z
CREATED:20230111T164225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230111T164225Z
UID:10018301-1688032800-1688040000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SS Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/ss-seminar/2023-06-29/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230629T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230629T143000
DTSTAMP:20230615T121241Z
CREATED:20230403T104457Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230615T121241Z
UID:10018596-1688043600-1688049000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Current Themes Seminar: Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Vrije Universiteit / St Andrews) "Should we be genealogically anxious? Contingency and agency in belief-forming processes"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In recent years\, there has been a lively debate among epistemologists on the implications of irrelevant influences on belief (White\, 2010) (Vavova\, 2016) (Shoenfield\, 2022) (among others). Seemingly\, many of our sophisticated\, complex beliefs are significantly influenced by (presumably epistemically irrelevant) factors such as our personal histories and the circumstances of our upbringing. If true\, what does this mean for the epistemic status of these beliefs and the presumed rationality of our belief-forming methods? Are beliefs ‘debunked’ when shown to have contingent origins\, where epistemically irrelevant factors (i.e.\, those that do not pertain directly to the truth or falsity of the beliefs in question) played a decisive role? This concern has been described as genealogical anxiety: the worry that the origins of beliefs\, once revealed to be influenced by irrelevant factors\, will undermine or cast doubt on those beliefs (Srinivasan 2015\, 2019). \nThe literature so far has predominantly focused on the contingency of irrelevant influences for the beliefs we come to hold. But there is another seemingly unsettling aspect of belief-forming processes which are heavily influenced by social and cultural factors that merits examination: that certain (most?) beliefs seem to be imposed on me by my epistemic environment suggests that I passively adopt them instead of exercising epistemic agency (Sosa\, 2013). To address this lacuna\, in this paper I present a model of belief-forming processes that highlights how circuits of attention and trust/distrust influence our belief-forming processes (Dutilh Novaes\, 2020). Cultural and social factors are naturally understood in terms of complex epistemic environments where not only (or not even primarily) first-order evidence matters; to a large extent\, our beliefs are formed by mechanisms of deference (Levy\, 2021). According to this model\, our beliefs are indeed largely shaped by the representations we happen to be exposed to and our attributions of trustworthiness (or lack thereof) to others. But the model also suggests that\, while there is a lot going on beyond our control that significantly shapes what we come to believe\, we still retain a certain degree of agency to the extent that we are able to rewire our circuits of attention and trust/distrust.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-current-themes-seminar-patrick-winther-larsen-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR