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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220404T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220404T110000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145630Z
CREATED:20210628T115628Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145630Z
UID:10017530-1649064600-1649070000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2/2022-04-04/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220404T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220404T170000
DTSTAMP:20220331T084239Z
CREATED:20210628T121010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220331T084239Z
UID:10017565-1649084400-1649091600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Katharine Jenkins (University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Against the Ontology-First Approach to Gender Recognition \nAbstract:\nThis talk engages with some recent public discussions about gender recognition\, understood as the ways in which people’s genders should be socially recognised\, for example in terms of how people should be able to navigate gendered social spaces.  I examine one of the many dysfunctions that currently characterise many of these discussions\, which is an assumption about the relationship between ontology and social practices. Roughly\, the assumption holds that settling the ontology of gender will automatically determine what shape our gendered social practices ought to take; I call this assumption ‘The Ontology First Approach’. I will show how the Ontology-First Approach creates problems for those who seek to defend trans-inclusive approaches to gender recognition\, and I will show how rejecting the approach opens up more fruitful ways of thinking about gender recognition. These ways involve treating many of the issues that are in question as being based on the practical consequences of different possible ways of organising our social practices\, rather than on facts about the ontology of social kinds. I argue that adopting this approach makes many questions about gender recognition much easier to resolve.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-6-2022-04-04/
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220405T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220405T140000
DTSTAMP:20220329T092933Z
CREATED:20210628T122532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220329T092933Z
UID:10017580-1649160000-1649167200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Tom Kaspers (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Correspondence as Convenient Friction: \nIn this talk\, I use Huw Price’s paper “Truth as Convenient Friction” (2003) as a blueprint for arguing that the correspondence theory of truth satisfies the Pragmatic Maxim. By aiming for correspondence\, friction is added to our disagreements — a kind of urgency to resolve disagreements — which transforms our inquiry from a mere expression of opinions into a proper assertoric dialogue. The article argues that other notions of truth\, like deflationary or epistemic notions\, do not have the resources required to explain this friction.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-9-2022-04-05/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220405T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220405T170000
DTSTAMP:20220401T111721Z
CREATED:20210629T142203Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220401T111721Z
UID:10017675-1649170800-1649178000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar: Sandra Mitchell (University of Pittsburgh) Are Emergent Phenomena Real?
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-5-2022-04-05/
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220407T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220407T120000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145615Z
CREATED:20210629T140951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145615Z
UID:10017661-1649325600-1649332800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-2022-04-07/2022-04-07/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220407T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220407T173000
DTSTAMP:20211213T164141Z
CREATED:20210629T142950Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211213T164141Z
UID:10017698-1649347200-1649352600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Kristie Dotson (UMich) "Beyond the Now: Epistemic Oppression and the “Common” Sense of Incarceration"
DESCRIPTION:POSTPONED TO 7/4/2022\n\nAbstract: In this presentation\, I narrate an encounter with 2 Black teenagers who attempted to steal my cellphone and the difficulty of insisting on accountability while avoiding the worst parts of the state-run criminal justice system. Ultimately\, I demonstrate that\, at times\, when a situation calls for accountability for a serious wrongdoing in the U.S. one can find oneself trapped in a “now” that has been constructed by 1) ineffective carceral imaginations\, 2) insufficient structural options for accountability\, and 3) inadequate lexicons of permissibility. I conclude by suggesting key questions for exploration in the U.S. carceral state are: what are the communities we want to build with the accountability options on which we rely? How can we make the current “common” sense of incarceration “uncommon?”
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-3-2021-12-02/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220411T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220411T173000
DTSTAMP:20220428T140329Z
CREATED:20210628T121010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220428T140329Z
UID:10017566-1649667600-1649698200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Workshop: Logical Disagreement
DESCRIPTION:Over the past fifteen years the epistemology of disagreement has been one of the most widely discussed research topics in epistemology. A special case of disagreement is logical disagreement\, i.e. disputes regarding the validity of certain inferences\, or the status of fundamental logical principles. This one-day Arché workshop is dedicated to the topic Disagreement in Logic and related issues such as logical pluralism\, the normativity of logic\, logical evidence. It will feature renowned experts of the epistemology of logic as well as early-career researchers. \nVenue: G03\, Edgecliffe\nTime: From 9am till 6pm on Monday April 11th\, 2022 (GMT)\nFormat: In person\nRegistration:  Please register your interest in attending by emailing our workshop organisers at fja4@st-andrews.ac.uk. \nSchedule\n• 9.00-9.30 Coffee and registration\n• 9.30-10.30 Speaker: Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm University)\nTitle: A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\n• 10.30-11.00 Coffee\n• 11.00-12.00 Speaker: Alessandro Rossi (NCH)\nTitle: The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\n• 12.00-13.30 Lunch (vegetarian and vegan options available)\n• 13.30-14.30 Speaker: Claire Field (University of Stirling)\nTitle: Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\n• 14.30-15.00 Coffee\n• 15.00-16.00 Frederik J. Andersen (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: Logical Akrasia\n• 16.00-16.30 Coffee\n• 16.30-17.30 Speaker: Jc Beall (University of Notre Dame)\nTitle: Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic \nTitles and Abstracts \nAnandi Hattiangadi—A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\nLogical disagreement is comprehensive: proponents of different logics disagree not only about the validity of particular logical laws\, but about the meanings of the logical constants\, and about the meaning or extension of the concept of logical consequence itself. This raises a puzzle. On the face of it\, there appear to be genuine disagreements about logic. However\, genuine disagreement requires a common subject matter about which to disagree: if A and B are not talking about the same thing\, then they are talking past one another; any apparent disagreement between them is merely verbal. The trouble is that since logical disagreement is so often comprehensive\, proponents of different logics seem to have too little in common to determine a common subject matter about which to disagree. If A and B apparently disagree whether some logical law is valid\, but they use ‘valid’ with different meanings or extensions\, they are talking past one another; their disagreement is merely verbal. My aim in this paper will be to explore this puzzle. \nAlessandro Rossi—The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\nConstant domain S5\, or the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\, seems to demand that we take (non)concreteness as a contingent feature of things. But could there be two equally correct views about the ontology of the contingently non-concrete? It is shown that a similar thesis incurs a principled and necessary refutation. Three objections to our claim are then considered and all are found wanting. \nClaire Field—Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\nIf logical pluralism is true\, then rational disagreement about logic is possible. Is rational disagreement also possible if logical pluralism is false? That is\, is it possible to rationally disagree about which is the correct logic\, while also being mistaken? Some have thought not\, and that it must always be irrational to believe falsely about what is rationally required (Titelbaum 2015). In so far as the correct logic encodes what is rationally required\, this means that mistakes about it cannot be rational. I compare this question to analogous one about non-logical requirements of rationality\, and show how answering it is somewhat more complicated for logical requirements\, because of the possibility that weighing one’s evidence implicates a background logic. I explore a proposal for treating mistakes about logical and non-logical requirements in the same way\, and argue that this gives us reason to think that level-incoherence is sometimes rationally required. \nFrederik J. Andersen—Logical Akrasia\nThe aim of this paper is twofold. First\, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia pace analogy to epistemic akrasia. Second\, §3 and §4 present a dilemma based on logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano arithmetic or akratic in our logical theorizing. It will then be left as an open question for future research what consequences the dilemma has for epistemic rationality. \nJc Beall—Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic\nAn account L of logical consequence (henceforth\, of logic) is subclassical if and only if \ni) every classically invalid argument is invalid according to L\, and\nii) some classically valid argument is invalid according to L. \nIn this talk I argue that the true account of logic is subclassical. (That’s the “classical logic is dead” part.) On the other hand—I believe (and so do you)—the vast majority of our true theories are classically closed; they rely on the full force of classical logic. And so such theories do; and so such theories should. (This is the “long live classical logic” part.) But there is no tension whatsoever in the death of classical logic together with its apparent ubiquity in our true theories. So I shall argue in this talk.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-6-2022-04-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220411
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220413
DTSTAMP:20220517T125304Z
CREATED:20211214T091754Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220517T125304Z
UID:10017714-1649667600-1649753999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Logical Disagreement
DESCRIPTION:Over the past fifteen years the epistemology of disagreement has been one of the most widely discussed research topics in epistemology. A special case of disagreement is logical disagreement\, i.e. disputes regarding the validity of certain inferences\, or the status of fundamental logical principles. This one-day Arché workshop is dedicated to the topic Disagreement in Logic and related issues such as logical pluralism\, the normativity of logic\, logical evidence. It will feature renowned experts of the epistemology of logic as well as early-career researchers. \nVenue: G03\, Edgecliffe\nTime: From 9am till 6pm on Monday April 11th\, 2022 (GMT)\nFormat: In person\nRegistration:  Please register your interest in attending by emailing our workshop organisers at fja4@st-andrews.ac.uk. \nSchedule\n• 9.00-9.30 Coffee and registration\n• 9.30-10.30 Speaker: Anandi Hattiangadi (Stockholm University)\nTitle: A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\n• 10.30-11.00 Coffee\n• 11.00-12.00 Speaker: Alessandro Rossi (NCH)\nTitle: The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\n• 12.00-13.30 Lunch (vegetarian and vegan options available)\n• 13.30-14.30 Speaker: Claire Field (University of Stirling)\nTitle: Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\n• 14.30-15.00 Coffee\n• 15.00-16.00 Frederik J. Andersen (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: Logical Akrasia\n• 16.00-16.30 Coffee\n• 16.30-17.30 Speaker: Jc Beall (University of Notre Dame)\nTitle: Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic \nTitles and Abstracts \nAnandi Hattiangadi—A Puzzle about Logical Disagreement\nLogical disagreement is comprehensive: proponents of different logics disagree not only about the validity of particular logical laws\, but about the meanings of the logical constants\, and about the meaning or extension of the concept of logical consequence itself. This raises a puzzle. On the face of it\, there appear to be genuine disagreements about logic. However\, genuine disagreement requires a common subject matter about which to disagree: if A and B are not talking about the same thing\, then they are talking past one another; any apparent disagreement between them is merely verbal. The trouble is that since logical disagreement is so often comprehensive\, proponents of different logics seem to have too little in common to determine a common subject matter about which to disagree. If A and B apparently disagree whether some logical law is valid\, but they use ‘valid’ with different meanings or extensions\, they are talking past one another; their disagreement is merely verbal. My aim in this paper will be to explore this puzzle. \nAlessandro Rossi—The Contingently Non-Concrete. Or Real Rivalry in the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\nConstant domain S5\, or the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic\, seems to demand that we take (non)concreteness as a contingent feature of things. But could there be two equally correct views about the ontology of the contingently non-concrete? It is shown that a similar thesis incurs a principled and necessary refutation. Three objections to our claim are then considered and all are found wanting. \nClaire Field—Rational Incoherence for Logical and Non-Logical Requirements\nIf logical pluralism is true\, then rational disagreement about logic is possible. Is rational disagreement also possible if logical pluralism is false? That is\, is it possible to rationally disagree about which is the correct logic\, while also being mistaken? Some have thought not\, and that it must always be irrational to believe falsely about what is rationally required (Titelbaum 2015). In so far as the correct logic encodes what is rationally required\, this means that mistakes about it cannot be rational. I compare this question to analogous one about non-logical requirements of rationality\, and show how answering it is somewhat more complicated for logical requirements\, because of the possibility that weighing one’s evidence implicates a background logic. I explore a proposal for treating mistakes about logical and non-logical requirements in the same way\, and argue that this gives us reason to think that level-incoherence is sometimes rationally required. \nFrederik J. Andersen—Logical Akrasia\nThe aim of this paper is twofold. First\, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia pace analogy to epistemic akrasia. Second\, §3 and §4 present a dilemma based on logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano arithmetic or akratic in our logical theorizing. It will then be left as an open question for future research what consequences the dilemma has for epistemic rationality. \nJc Beall—Classical logic is dead. Long live classical logic\nAn account L of logical consequence (henceforth\, of logic) is subclassical if and only if \ni) every classically invalid argument is invalid according to L\, and\nii) some classically valid argument is invalid according to L. \nIn this talk I argue that the true account of logic is subclassical. (That’s the “classical logic is dead” part.) On the other hand—I believe (and so do you)—the vast majority of our true theories are classically closed; they rely on the full force of classical logic. And so such theories do; and so such theories should. (This is the “long live classical logic” part.) But there is no tension whatsoever in the death of classical logic together with its apparent ubiquity in our true theories. So I shall argue in this talk. \n 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/disagreement-in-logic/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/WLD-e1645456834730.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220411T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220411T110000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145630Z
CREATED:20210628T115628Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145630Z
UID:10017531-1649669400-1649674800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2/2022-04-11/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220412T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220412T140000
DTSTAMP:20220406T094813Z
CREATED:20210628T122532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220406T094813Z
UID:10017581-1649764800-1649772000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Stefano Pugnaghi (St Andrews / Bonn)
DESCRIPTION:Predicativism\, Metasemantics and Circularity
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-9-2022-04-05-2022-04-12/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220412T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220412T170000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145603Z
CREATED:20210629T142203Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145603Z
UID:10017676-1649775600-1649782800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-5-2022-04-12/2022-04-12/
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar,Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220413T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220413T180000
DTSTAMP:20220405T152430Z
CREATED:20210629T140652Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220405T152430Z
UID:10017647-1649865600-1649872800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Lara Jost\, "The Labours of Chronic Illness"
DESCRIPTION:Lara Jost will be giving the following presentation\, titled The Labours of Chronic Illness. The seminar will take a hyrbid format. The in-person seminar will take place Castlecliffe G5W – Seminar Room. To attend online please email arche-fem-soc@st-andrews.ac.uk for the attendance link. \n\n\n\nThe Labours of Chronic Illness\nLara Jost \n\n\nIn this presentation\, I aim to explain two types of labour – hermeneutic labour and epistemic labour- that chronically ill people have to engage in to get good care. The goal is to highlight why being chronically ill is often considered by many chronically ill people to be a full-time or part-time job\, often without being recognized as such by others. I explain why these two labours are disproportionately higher when it comes to certain chronic illnesses. I discuss how these labours cannot be fully explained by the presence of political structures and the underfunding of healthcare. Contrary to these two commonly accepted explanations\, I argue that this higher cost is in part the result of a deep disagreement about how these patients should testify about their illness\, caused by a cluster of types of epistemic injustices. To illustrate this dynamic\, I attend to the applied case of endometriosis\, a gynaecological chronic illness causing pelvic pain and infertility.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-s2-2022-04-13/
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T120000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145615Z
CREATED:20210629T140951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145615Z
UID:10017662-1649930400-1649937600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-2022-04-07/2022-04-14/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T173000
DTSTAMP:20220405T092503Z
CREATED:20210629T150804Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220405T092503Z
UID:10017701-1649952000-1649957400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA): David Christensen (Brown) "Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes\, and what she believes about what she’s rational to believe. Epistemic akrasia—for example\, believing P while believing that P is not rational to believe in your situation—is often seen as intrinsically irrational. This paper argues otherwise. In certain cases\, akrasia is intuitively rational. Understanding why akratic beliefs in those case are indeed rational provides a deeper explanation how typical akratic beliefs are irrational—an explanation that does not flow from akrasia per se. This understanding also allows us to diagnose where general anti-akratic arguments go wrong. We can then see why even principles designed to allow only moderate akrasia fail\, and also why recognizing the possibility of rational akratic beliefs does not call for finding some other epistemic defect in agents who believe akratically. Believing akratically\, in itself\, is nothing to apologize for.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-5/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220418T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220418T170000
DTSTAMP:20220414T151956Z
CREATED:20210628T121010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220414T151956Z
UID:10017567-1650272400-1650301200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Workshop: Logic of Identity
DESCRIPTION:Given a theory – e.g.\, in mathematics\, theology\, physics\, sociology\, political theory – what is it for the objects of that theory to be identical? Not all true theories give the same answer: it can depend on the objects of the theory. The logic of identity\, as current research stands\, is largely confined to the standard framework of classical logic. Non-classical logics have proven to be important in philosophy\, and they are promising for related disciplines. What we lack\, as current research stands\, are natural\, simple\, and widely applicable accounts of identity for the family of non-classical frameworks. This one-day Arché workshop will explore the prospects for non-classical logical approaches to identity and their possible applications. \nVenue: G03\, Edgecliffe\nTime: From 9am till 5pm on Monday April 18th\, 2022 (BST)\nFormat: In person\nRegistration:  Please register your interest in attending by emailing our workshop organisers at mn85@st-andrews.ac.uk \nSchedule \n\n9.00-9.30 Coffee and registration\n9.30-10.45 Speaker: Matteo Nizzardo (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: The Identity of Indiscernibles’ Weakest Interesting Interpretation\n10.45-11.15 Coffee\n11.15-12.30 Speaker: JC Beall (University of Notre Dame)\nTitle: The leibnizian recipe\, difference makers\, and relative identity\n12.30-14.00 Lunch break\n14.00-15.15 Speaker: Greg Restall (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: Exploring three-valued models for identity\n15:15-15.45 Coffee\n15:45-17:00 Franz Berto (University of St Andrews)\nTitle: Counting the Particles: Permutations\, Identity\, and Indiscernibility\n\nTitles and Abstracts \nMatteo Nizzardo — The Identity of Indiscernibles’ Weakest Interesting Interpretation \nAccording to Strawson (1959) the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) holds that no two individuals can share all their qualitative properties. This has been challenged by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006)\, who suggests a weaker non-trivial interpretation of PII according to which no two individuals can share all their nontrivializing properties. I argue that Rodriguez-Pereyra’s reading of PII entails an infinite regress\, which can be avoided only by committing to individuals that differ only numerically. I generalise the result to any interpretation of PII that is weaker than Strawson’s\, and conclude that the weakest interesting version of PII is the one restricting the domain of quantification to qualitative properties only. \n  \nJC Beall — The leibnizian recipe\, difference makers\, and relative identity \nI think of identity relations as the product of the leibnizian recipe\, which basically defines an identity relation R via a biconditional scheme: \naRb is true iff all relevant instances of PHI(a)<—>PHI(b) are true. \naRb is false iff some relevant instance of PHI(a)<—>PHI(b) is false. \nClearly\, the entailment behavior of the identity relation R will turn not only on the entailment behavior of the biconditional in the scheme but also on the range of the schematic variable. Example: use classical-logic ingredients (ergo\, classical material conditional) and R is an equivalence relation. Use subclassical ingredients (e.g.\, FDE) and\, well\, R certainly needn’t be an equivalence relation (though\, in the confines of some theories\, can be an equivalence relation\, depending on the language of the given theory and especially the range of PHI). \nAll of this is familiar; it’s basically the standard recipe for identity relations. (And if you shop at the standard store for your ingredients\, you’ll get the standard identity relation sometimes called ‘classical identity’.) Let’s assume — as I in fact believe — that this standard recipe is correct (though standard ingredients aren’t necessary). \nAgainst the backdrop of (by my lights) the somewhat perplexing debate over “relative identity” (e.g.\, Geach\, Martin\, van Inwagen\, Rea)\, I show that relative identity relations simply drop out of the standard leibnizian recipe\, at least if associated sets of “difference makers” are made explicit. \nAgainst some (so-called “pure”) relative-identity theorists\, I think that we have not only a gazillion relative-identity relations (as all relative-identity theorists believe); we also have many (if not exactly a gazillion) non-relative identity relations — all easily traced back to the leibnizian recipe. \nThe result should be good news for so-called relative-identity theorists. The reason is that\, to my knowledge\, such theorists never actually explicitly define relative-identity relations; they just wave at features of “is-the-same-PHI-as” that’s supposed to somehow define the relations. (But they don’t\, so far as I’ve seen.) If I’m right\, relative-identity theorists are just leibnizian-recipe theorists with a few small twists.   \n  \nGreg Restall — Exploring three-valued models for identity\n \nThere is an very natural way to interpret the propositional connectives and quantifiers\, relative to the algebra of three semantic values\, {0\, i\, 1} where 0 and 1 are understood as the traditional values of falsity and truth\, and the third value is some intermediate value. The evaluation clauses do not\, by themselves\, determine the logic\, because for that\, you need to determine how models are used to provide a counterexample to a sequent. If a counterexample is given by a model that assigns every premise the value 1 and assigns every conclusion a value other than 1\, the resulting logic is Kleene’s strong three-valued logic\, K3. If a counterexample is a model assigning every premise the value 1 or i and every conclusion the value 0\, the resulting logic is Priest’s logic of paradox\, LP. If a counterexample is a model assigning every premise the value 1 and every conclusion the value 0\, you get the logic ST of Strict-Tolerant validity. ST is distinctive\, in that it is\, in some sense\, classical logic—every classically valid sequent in this language is ST-valid—but since it has strictly non-classical models\, there are ST theories which are not classical theories. \nWhat does this mean for the logic of identity in a three-valued context? \nIn this talk\, I will explain how the classical logic of identity\, when interpreted in ST models\, gives us a well-behaved class of three-valued models for identity—much larger than the traditional models for identity\, used by afficianados of LP or K3—which can be used to model the distinctive non-classical behaviour of identity statements\, with a greater degree of freedom than we might have thought. \n  \nFranz Berto — Counting the Particles: Permutations\, Identity\, and Indiscernibility  \nI’d like to attack a certain view: the view that the concept of identity can fail to apply to some things although\, for some positive integer n\, we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously entertained in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. It is so pervasive that it has been labelled the Received View. In this talk\, I introduce the Received View; I explain what I mean by “entity” (synonymously\, by “object” and “thing”)\, and I argue that supporters of the Received View should agree with my characterization of the corresponding notion of entity (object\, thing). I also explain what I mean by “identity”\, and I show that supporters of the Received View agree with my characterization of that notion. Then\, I argue that the concept of identity\, so characterized\, is one with the concept of oneness. Thus\, it cannot but apply to what belongs to a collection with n elements\, n being a positive integer. I add some considerations on the primitiveness of identity or unity and the status of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Finally\, I say something on the problem of how reference to indiscernible objects with identity can be achieved.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-6-2022-04-18/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220418
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220420
DTSTAMP:20211214T160016Z
CREATED:20211214T092102Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211214T160016Z
UID:10017715-1650272400-1650358799@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Logic of Identity
DESCRIPTION:Given a theory – e.g.\, in mathematics\, theology\, physics\, sociology\, political theory – what is it for the objects of that theory to be identical? Not all true theories give the same answer: it can depend on the objects of the theory. The logic of identity\, as current research stands\, is largely confined to the standard framework of classical logic. Non-classical logics have proven to be important in philosophy\, and they are promising for related disciplines. What we lack\, as current research stands\, are natural\, simple\, and widely applicable accounts of identity for the family of non-classical frameworks. This one-day Arché workshop will explore the prospects for non-classical logical approaches to identity and their possible applications.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/logic-of-identity/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220418T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220418T110000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145630Z
CREATED:20210628T115628Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145630Z
UID:10017532-1650274200-1650279600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2/2022-04-18/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220419T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220419T110000
DTSTAMP:20220328T111110Z
CREATED:20210628T115628Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220328T111110Z
UID:10017545-1650360600-1650366000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2-2022-04-18/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220419T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220419T140000
DTSTAMP:20220419T113931Z
CREATED:20210628T122532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220419T113931Z
UID:10017582-1650369600-1650376800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Viktoria Knoll (TU Dresden)
DESCRIPTION:Personal Identity: A Deflationist Challenge \nThe talk will present a deflationist take on the debate about personal identity\, which has received little attention to date. According to the view developed\, the two main parties in the personal identity debate apply terms such as “persons” and “we” differently. They are merely talking past each other. While the paper presents various pieces of evidence suggesting that the debate is a merely verbal dispute\, it also points to some provisos attached to such a deflationist approach.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-9-2022-04-05-2022-04-19/
LOCATION:In person/hybrid
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220419T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220419T170000
DTSTAMP:20220419T114043Z
CREATED:20210629T142203Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220419T114043Z
UID:10017677-1650380400-1650387600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar: Mark Pinder (Open University) Conceptual Engineering\, Methods\, and Methodologies
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-5-2022-04-19/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220420T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220420T180000
DTSTAMP:20220419T114125Z
CREATED:20210629T140652Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220419T114125Z
UID:10017648-1650470400-1650477600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Nick Allen Intersectionality: An Intellectual History" from Ange-Marie Hancock's book Intersectionality
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-s2-2022-04-20/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220421T103000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220421T120000
DTSTAMP:20220419T114202Z
CREATED:20210629T150804Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220419T114202Z
UID:10017702-1650537000-1650542400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA): Stephanie Collins (Monash) "Legislative Intent: A Rational Unity Account"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Does the legislature have intentions concerning the effects of legislation? If so\, how can that intent be known by outsiders? Existing theories of legislative intent can be divided into three camps: skepticism\, constructivism\, and realism. This paper begins by outlining problems for existing realist accounts. The paper then offers a new realist theory of legislative intent: the rational unity account. The paper explains how this account avoids the problems with existing versions of realism\, while also capturing the sense in which the legislature is a rational agent with intentions that can be distinguished from the intentions of individual legislators. We explain what evidence outsiders can\, and should\, use when attributing intentions to the legislature. \nCo-authored with David Tan (Deakin University)
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-5-2022-04-21/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220425T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220425T110000
DTSTAMP:20221019T145630Z
CREATED:20210628T115628Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221019T145630Z
UID:10017533-1650879000-1650884400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-2/2022-04-25/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220425T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220425T170000
DTSTAMP:20220428T141013Z
CREATED:20210628T121010Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220428T141013Z
UID:10017568-1650898800-1650906000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Gillian Russell (Australian Catholic University)
DESCRIPTION:Reading group session on an unpublished draft of the Introduction of the book Barriers to Entailment\, authored by Gillian Russell.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-seminar-6-2022-04-25/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220426T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220426T140000
DTSTAMP:20220419T144405Z
CREATED:20210628T122532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220419T144405Z
UID:10017583-1650974400-1650981600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong  (Duke University)
DESCRIPTION:Can an Artificial Intelligence ever be a Person with Consciousness and Free Will? \nSaudi Arabia awarded citizenship to a robot\, and the European Parliament is considering legislation giving some legal rights to computers. Does this make any sense? And what conditions would an AI need to meet in order to be a person with moral rights and duties? Can an AI ever meet those conditions? To begin to answer such questions\, I will discuss whether an AI could ever have consciousness and free will and whether an AI can make moral judgments.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-9-2022-04-05-2022-04-26/
LOCATION:In person/hybrid
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220426T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220426T170000
DTSTAMP:20220419T093536Z
CREATED:20210629T142203Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220419T093536Z
UID:10017678-1650985200-1650992400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar: Herman Cappelen (Hong Kong)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-5-2022-04-26/
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220427T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220427T180000
DTSTAMP:20220422T111945Z
CREATED:20210629T140652Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220422T111945Z
UID:10017649-1651075200-1651082400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Kate Ritchie\, "Social Structures in Context"
DESCRIPTION:Professor Kate Ritchie (UC Irvine) will be presenting work co-authored with Dr Jessica Keiser (Leeds) titled “Social Structures in Context”. The talk will take place online; to receive details of how to join\, please email arche-fem-soc [at] st-andrews.ac.uk. \n  \nSocial Structures in Context  \nLanguage is situated. That is\, the social location of language users both shapes and sets limits on speech. This relation also holds in the reverse direction: speech both shapes and sets limits on one’s social location. It is striking\, then\, that formal pragmatic theory tends to abstract away from the social locations of language users. In this paper we claim not only that social location should be incorporated into any viable pragmatic theory\, but that it should play a particular theoretical role: as part of the context. Second\, we argue that the standard Common Ground framework is not up to this task; a pragmatic theory needs to be at once more individualistic and more external in order to represent and explain linguistic phenomena related to social location. We then develop a proposal for a novel pragmatic framework that meets these conditions.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-s2-2022-04-27/
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220428T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220428T120000
DTSTAMP:20220427T091525Z
CREATED:20210629T140951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220427T091525Z
UID:10017673-1651140000-1651147200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Staff-Student meeting
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/super-special-2022-04-28/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220428T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220428T143000
DTSTAMP:20220427T131538Z
CREATED:20210629T150804Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220427T131538Z
UID:10017703-1651150800-1651156200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Jack Woods (Leeds) "This is how we do it: Lessons from choosing a logic" [Hybrid]
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In the past couple of decades\, the slate of logical alternatives has grown rather spectacularly large. Moreover\, there’s been an increasing amount of work on how\, whether\, and when we should consider modifying the logical bedrock of our methods of inquiry. The situation of logic choice\, though\, offers a rather unique epistemic situation which contains lessons for more general epistemological issues. I’ll draw out a few of these lessons\, pointing out how the situation of logic choice\, gives us insight into the grounds of our most basic epistemic methods. \nHybrid talk. Join us online or in School V.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-5-2022-04-28/
LOCATION:School V\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR