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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241216T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241216T110000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240930T082654Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240930T082655Z
UID:10019143-1734341400-1734346800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Strode's Consequentiae
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-5-2/2024-12-16/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, St Andrews\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241213T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241213T173000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20241104T131006Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241212T221120Z
UID:10019379-1734082200-1734111000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:All Arché Research Day (Winter 2024)
DESCRIPTION:This Friday\, the Arché term wraps up with another all-day all-Arché get-together\, featuring research presentations from Sabina Domínguez Parrado\, Lara Scheibli\, Stephen Read\, and Franz Berto\, and five-minute lightning talks from brave presenters including Jessica Brown\, Simon Prosser\, Christopher Masterman\, and more. \nWe’ll be in G03 from 9:30am. \n9:45: Stephen Read (Insolubles in Fourteenth-Century Logic\, or: What Have I Been Doing For The Last Seven Years) \n10:45: Coffee Break \n11:15: Lightning Talks: Simon Prosser (Mental Hypertime)\, Jessica Brown (Defending Epistemology)\, Sophie Nagler (Two logicians walk into a bar… A talk of misunderstandings)\, … \n11:45: Sabina Domínguez Parrado (The Semantic Motivation for Logical Pluralism) \n1:00: Lunch Break \n2:00: Franz Berto (From the Gospel According to David Lewis: Counterfactuals\, §3.2 — and Beyond) \n3:00: Coffee Break \n3:15: Lightning Talks: Christopher Masterman (Explaining Composition)\, Greg Restall (What Can We Mean?)\, … \n3:45: Lara Scheibli (Why Professors Should Not Sleep With Their Students – The Epistemology of Consent and Professor-Student Sex) \nAll of the presentations are in-person. The Teams link is provided for Arché Members who are not able to attend in person.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/all-arche-research-day-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241031T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241031T120000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20241009T132357Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241029T111542Z
UID:10019190-1730372400-1730376000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Arché Staff/Student Organisational Meeting
DESCRIPTION:Every semester\, we hold an all-of-Arché Staff/Student organisational meeting for everyone to attend. Tea/Coffee will be available. Agenda TBC
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-5-3/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241015T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241015T140000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20241009T130210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241009T130244Z
UID:10019120-1728993600-1729000800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Brice Bantegnie
DESCRIPTION:Title: It’s personal and it’s fine \nAbstract: Believing is something that one does\, or so one might say. Seeing as well. Detecting the edges of objects is not. Believing is a personal state. Seeing as well. Detecting is a sub-personal event or process. The personal/sub-personal distinction is intuitive. In recent papers\, some have argued that it is problematic. I argue that it is not. Two criticisms are that it is not principled (cf. Mason Westfall) and that it potentially stifles the work of cognitive scientists by misdescribing their practices (cf. Robert Rupert.) The personal/sub-personal distinction\, as applied to states\, is a special case of a distinction between the state something is in and the states its parts are in. Further commitments are not necessary and only come down the line. As a consequence\, one can both take it that there is such a distinction in cognitive science and that it puts no external constraint on the activity of cognitive scientists
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-34-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240711T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240711T170000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240701T140855Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240701T140855Z
UID:10019342-1720713600-1720717200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Reading Group - Midnight Sun
DESCRIPTION:You are cordially invited to join us on a cover-to-cover reading of Meyer’s 2020 Midnight Sun. The meeting will be online. We will discuss chapters 5-10. Still\, even if you don’t manage to catch up on the reading\, you’re still more than welcome to show up! If you want to sign up get in touch with the organisers: Naomi Sutton Kachani (ns234@st-andrews.ac.uk) and Sebastián Stuart Betanzos (sasb1@st-andrews.ac.uk). \nFull invite: You are cordially invited to join us on a cover-to-cover reading of Meyer’s 2020 Midnight Sun. This is the much-anticipated reimagining of Twilight (2005)\, by the same author. In this book\, Meyer retells the early story of the meeting between Bella Swan and Edward Cullen through a shift from the former’s limited human gaze to the latter’s supernatural psychic gaze. This switch in narration radically widens the perspectival scope of the story by placing us within the thoughts of a mind with unmediated access to all Other minds around him\, except that of Swan. What implications does this shift have for how we interpret the moral\, aesthetic\, and cultural value of the Twilight saga as a whole?
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-reading-group-midnight-sun/
LOCATION:Online via Teams
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory,Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Reading Group
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/81yWRTJfy-L._AC_UF8941000_QL80_.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240704T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240704T170000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240320T135530Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240327T133156Z
UID:10018849-1720105200-1720112400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity Pre-Reading: Quasi-Analysis II
DESCRIPTION:Mormann\, Thomas (2009). New Work for Carnap’s Quasi-Analysis. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (3):249-282.\nhttps://philpapers.org/rec/MORNWF-2 \nALT:\nDecock\, Lieven & Douven\, Igor (2011). Similarity After Goodman. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):61-75.\nhttps://philpapers.org/rec/DECSAG
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/unity-pre-reading-quasi-analysis-2/
LOCATION:Arché Seminar Room\, 17-19 College Street\, St Andrews\, KY169AL
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
GEO:56.3408615;-2.7948441
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240703T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240703T170000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240328T141948Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240625T091505Z
UID:10018865-1720018800-1720026000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Greg Restall (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: What do we mean? Semantics\, Practices and Pluralism\n \nAbstract: In this informal talk\, I will revisit some longstanding issues in philosophical logic in the light of some contemporary developments. \n \nThe longstanding issues? (1) Michael Dummett’s challenge in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics to the effect that to get anywhere in fundamental issues of metaphysics we would do well to attend to the fundamental commitments of our theory of meaning—and that those concerns lead to the conclusion that we can find common ground in intuitionistic logic\, not classical logic. (2) The issue of pluralism (or monism) about logical consequence. Contemporary work in logic is filled with a range of different (and seemingly opposed) accounts of what follows from what. Many different kinds of logical pluralism have arisen to attempt to make sense of the diversity of logical analyses\, and just as many defences of logical monism have been offered.\n \nThe contemporary developments? The rise of dependent type theory in computer science and the consequent rise of proof assistants in the formalisation of mathematics. Different proof assistants (Agda\, Idris\, Lean\, Isabelle\, Coq) make different choices in the formal representation of mathematical reasoning\, but the predominant choice of these proof assistants is to represent proofs constructively\, in what amounts to intuitionistic logic and not classical logic. Proof assistants are steadily gaining ground in the mathematical community—mathematicians use these tools as conversation partners in the development of mathematical proofs\, and many of these conversation partners have intuitionistic scruples. \n \nI will reexamine Dummett’s appeal to revisit fundamental commitments in our theory of meaning\, and the challenge of logical pluralism\, given the example of the use of proof assistants in mathematical reasoning. We will see that paying attention to different aspects of our reasoning practices can clarify what is at stake in debates over the use of this or that logic\, or about the propriety of some semantic principle. In the end\, I hope to show that—as Dummett argued—it is worthwhile to spend some time attending to the concepts we use in our theorising\, just as the astronomer must take care of her telescopes if she wants to see clearly and see far\, and understand the power and limits of her tools. However\, I will also show that taking Dummett’s advice does not mean that we must accept his restrictive conclusion about the impropriety of classical reasoning. Classical reasoning can be vindicated\, but at some cost.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-20/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T170000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240408T103032Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240701T101531Z
UID:10018997-1719932400-1719939600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CANCELLED FPST Seminar - Clare Chambers (Cambridge)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Respect\, Religion\, and Feminism: Political Liberalism as Feminist Liberalism?\nAbstract: This chapter considers whether political liberalism\, specifically\, can be used for feminist ends. There is significant disagreement among feminists and liberals about the compatibility between their two doctrines. Political liberalism is vulnerable to particular criticism from feminists\, who argue that its restricted form of equality is insufficient. In contrast\, Lori Watson and Christie Hartley argue that political liberalism can and must be feminist. This chapter raises three areas of disagreement with Watson and Hartley’s incisive account of feminist political liberalism. First\, the chapter argues that an appeal to a comprehensive doctrine can be compatible with respecting others\, if that appeal is to the value of equality. Second\, the chapter takes issue with Watson and Hartley’s defence of religious exemptions to equality law. Third\, the chapter argues that political liberalism can be compatible with feminism\, but that it is not itself adequately feminist. The chapter concludes that political liberalism is not enough for feminists.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-12-10/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T140000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240628T080144Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240628T080215Z
UID:10018931-1719921600-1719928800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Derek Ball (University of St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Immanent Interpretation”\nBryan Pickel and Derek Ball\n\nAbstract: Famous arguments purport to show that all\, or a substantial fragment\, of language is indeterminate in meaning.  Quine and Davidson motivated indeterminacy arguments by attending to the possibility of different translations of a foreign language and to the possibility of differing uses of homophonic expressions among speakers of the same language; more contemporary versions focus on the interpretation of context-sensitive expressions such as quantifier domain restrictions (Heck\, Buchanan).  We show that these arguments fail because they ignore evidence that is available to interpreters – evidence that arises from the interpreters themselves as language users.  But our aim is not merely to rebut indeterminacy arguments.  We construct a research strategy for interpreters to meet the concerns of the proponents of indeterminacy arguments.  The strategy is available to interpreters in a wide range of cases\, but (time permitting) we will also discuss cases (such as the interpretation of AI\, or of non-human animals) in which it might fail.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-40/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240628T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240628T170000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240318T124733Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240620T074754Z
UID:10018837-1719568800-1719594000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:All Arché Research Day
DESCRIPTION:The All Arché Research Day is a whole-of-Arché get-together. It’s an opportunity to foster interaction between research streams\, and to celebrate achievements from the year 2023-2024. \nSession 1: 10am-11am (Chair: Jessica Brown) \nTalk 1 Katharina Bernhard: Epistemic Projection and Inductive Risk \nCoffee Break: 11am-11:30am \nSession 2: 11:30am-1pm (Chair: Francesco Berto) \nLightning talks: 11:30am-12noon\n(Jessica Brown\, Greg Restall\, Cecily Whiteley) \nTalk 2: 12noon-1:00pm\nViviane Fairbank: Is Logic Objective? \nLunch Break: 1:00pm-2:00pm (Catered) \nSession 3: 2:00pm-3:00pm (Chair: Aaron Cotnoir) \nTalk 3: Hoaxu Wang: On the Qualification of Being—A Quiddity in the Context of Russellian Monism \nCoffee Break: 3:00pm-3:30pm \nSession 4: 3:30pm-5:00pm (Chair: Jade Fletcher) \nLightning talks: 3:30pm-4:00pm\n(Aaron Cotnoir\, Francesco Berto\, …) \nTalk 4: 4:00pm-5:00pm\nEmma Holmes: The Philosophy of Diets \nAfter Drinks at Brewdog
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/all-arche-research-day/
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240627T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240627T143000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240320T133438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240624T103556Z
UID:10018784-1719493200-1719498600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Matt McGrath (Washington University in St Louis)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Matt McGrath (Washington University in St Louis) \nShould have Known and Epistemically Appropriate Belief\nSometimes people don’t know things they should have known. For instance\, cardiologists should know about recent major developments that bear on their practice; if they don’t know\, they should have. Can what a person should have known matter to what they’re epistemically appropriate to believe? Call the view that it can “should-have-known impurism.” If the cardiologist believes the usual treatment for a certain type of heart disease is best but should have known that an alternative treatment outperformed it in a recent large study\, it seems the cardiologist isn’t believing as she should. In this paper\, I dig into the reasoning behind or suggested by intuitions like this. Once we locate this reasoning\, we can probe its structure\, assess its quality\, and explore variations of it\, along with its relation to intuitions on the opposing “purist” side. In the end\, I argue that we can capture what the impurist gets right without accepting impurism. This is important because\, as I argue\, impurism faces serious problems.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-7-8/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240627T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240627T120000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240529T144003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240529T144004Z
UID:10019062-1719482400-1719489600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar-3-3/2024-06-27/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240614T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240614T173000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240610T142037Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240610T142909Z
UID:10019341-1718380800-1718386200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Reading Group - Midnight Sun
DESCRIPTION:You are cordially invited to join us on a cover-to-cover reading of Meyer’s 2020 Midnight Sun. The meeting will be online\, and the session will be around 60 minutes. The plan is to discuss the book’s first five chapters\, as well as set up a plan and dates for our next sessions. If you want to sing up get in touch with the organisers: Naomi Sutton Kachani (ns234@st-andrews.ac.uk) and Sebastián Stuart Betanzos (sasb1@st-andrews.ac.uk). \nFull invite: You are cordially invited to join us on a cover-to-cover reading of Meyer’s 2020 Midnight Sun. This is the much-anticipated reimagining of Twilight (2005)\, by the same author. In this book\, Meyer retells the early story of the meeting between Bella Swan and Edward Cullen through a shift from the former’s limited human gaze to the latter’s supernatural psychic gaze. This switch in narration radically widens the perspectival scope of the story by placing us within the thoughts of a mind with unmediated access to all Other minds around him\, except that of Swan. What implications does this shift have for how we interpret the moral\, aesthetic\, and cultural value of the Twilight saga as a whole?
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-readign-group-midnight-sun/
LOCATION:Online via Teams
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory,Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Reading Group
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/81yWRTJfy-L._AC_UF8941000_QL80_.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240607
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240609
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240226T142355Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250114T142815Z
UID:10018769-1717750800-1717837199@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Modality: With or Without Possible Worlds?
DESCRIPTION:The University of St Andrews Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics and Epistemology will be hosting a workshop on Modality\, With or Without Possible Worlds?\n\n \nDESCRIPTION: The purpose of the workshop is to bring together and promote research in the area of metaphysics of modality\, with a specific focus on two broad themes: (i) the challenges associated with exclusively employing possible worlds to clarify our modal discourse about metaphysical necessity and possibility\, among other metaphysical concepts; and (ii) alternative approaches that shed light on such discourse without relying on the concept of a possible world.\n \nDATE AND VENUE: 7 June 2024\, Online on Teams\n \nSPEAKERS: Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern)\, Barbara Vetter (Freie Universität Berlin)\, Jennifer Wang (Simon Fraser University)\, Mark Jago (University of Nottingham)\, Takashi Tagisawa (California State University)\, and John Divers (Trinity College Dublin).\n\n \n\nREGISTER HERE: https://forms.gle/Cnh4zpbyFXPzhg7v8\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\nPROVISIONAL SCHEDULE (Note: All times are in British Summer Time):\nEvery time slot includes: the main talk (40 mins)\, and Q&A (20 mins).\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n9:55 – 10:00 Preliminary Remarks \n10:00 – 11:00 Barbara Vetter (Freie Universität Berlin) \n11:00 – 11:15 Break \n11:15 – 12:15 Mark Jago (University of Nottingham) \n12:15 – 12:30 Break \n12:30 – 13:30 Jennifer Wang (Simon Fraser University) \n13:30 – 14:30 Break \n14:30 – 15:30 John Divers (Trinity College Dublin) \n15:30 – 15:45 Break \n15:45 – 16:45 Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \n16:45 – 17:00 Break \n\n17:00 – 18:00 Takashi Yagisawa (California State University) \n\n \n \nTITLES AND ABSTRACTS: \n \n\nTitle: Modal epistemology without worlds: the case of axiom T (Barbara Vetter)\n \nAbstract: Epistemologists of modality often assume that some knowledge of possibility is easy: knowledge by inference from actuality\, via axiom T of modal logic. What is true in this world must be true at some world\, after all; what could be easier? Inference by axiom T takes centre stage in similarity based modal epistemologies like that of Sonia Roca Royes\, but it is generally assumed to be a form of easy modal knowledge. In this talk\, I argue that the role of axiom T in a realistic modal epistemology has been overstated. The case of axiom T also serves as a case study for a general caveat not to project to much of our (modal) logic into a realistic (modal) epistemology.\n\n \n\n\nTitle: Knowing What it Is (Mark Jago) \nAbstract: Essentialists understand modal properties in terms of the essences of things. Given this view\, it is natural to think that our knowledge of modality ultimately derives from our knowledge of the essences of things. Is that view plausible? Do we genuinely have knowledge of the essences of things\, in a form substantial enough to ground our modal knowledge? The more we pack into the notion of essence to allow it to underpin modal properties\, the harder it is to claim genuine knowledge. I will argue that realists about essence of a certain kind can have the best of both worlds. They can co-opt a conventionalist explanation of our knowledge of essence\, but against the background of a fully realist notion of essence. \n\n\n\n \n\nTitle: The Explanatory Grounds of De Re Modal Truths (Jennifer Wang)\n\nAbstract: In Naming and Necessity\, Kripke makes a forceful case for the actualist against the so-called “problem of transworld identification”. If the goal is to be able to use possible worlds semantics\, then I think that his response is entirely correct. But if the goal is to provide an explanation of de re modal truths\, then the actualist should reject transworld identity. In this paper\, I argue that the actualist who wants to use possible worlds to explain facts such as “Oscar could have been a movie star” should adopt a purely qualitative conception of possible worlds. Perhaps more surprisingly\, they should combine this with a counterpart-theoretic treatment of de re modality. I will argue that this combination is consistent with actualist motivations\, and with Kripke’s views in particular.\n\n\n \n\nTitle: Modality\, With or Without Possible Worlds? A Quinean Perspective (John Divers)\nAbstract: We may proceed in the philosophy of modality with\, or without\, deploying the device of quantification over possible worlds. How we think of the advantages and disadvantages brought by the respective approaches will be determined for the most part on whether we are presupposing some form of modal realism. Here\, I will address the matter from a modal anti-realist and – more specifically – Quinean perspective\n\n\n \n\nTitle: Counterpossibles\, Causal Exclusion\, and Impossible Worlds (Vera Hoffman-Kolss)\nAbstract: In this paper\, I argue that counterpossible conditionals\, whose truth conditions are formulated in terms of impossible worlds\, can shed new light on the problem of causal exclusion. According to the interventionist version of this problem\, higher-level (e.g.\, mental) properties described by an interventionist causal model are causally pre-empted by the lower-level properties upon which they supervene\, because it is metaphysically impossible to intervene on the higher-level properties without changing at least some of the lower-level properties (which then do all the causal work). Recent debate has shown\, however\, that there are several reasons to allow for counterpossible interventions as well. But once counterpossible interventions are allowed in certain metaphysical contexts\, there is no good reason to ban them from causal exclusion contexts. I argue that this paves the way for a new approach to the causal exclusion problem. The autonomy of higher-level properties can be vindicated by showing that higher-level properties and lower-level properties enter into different counterpossible dependence relations. These counterpossible dependence relations can in turn be interpreted in terms of impossible worlds.\n \nTitle: Ontology of Some Philosophy (Takashi Yagisawa)\n\nAbstract: When philosophers discuss philosophical views\, theories\, or arguments\, their discussion is often not metaphysically innocent. Given certain substantial but widely accepted assumptions concerning relativization of truth\, the worlds framework\, and understanding ontological issues in terms of domains of discourse (see Three Insights below)\, it can be argued that the extent of ontological involvement of some philosophical discussion is considerable. In particular\, philosophical discussion concerning modal metaphysics frequently makes the discussants incur non-trivial ontological commitments.\n\nThree Insights:\n(1 )It is useful to relativize the notion of truth for many philosophical purposes; a sentence is true or false at a truth-relativizer.\n(2) The framework of worlds\, including both possible worlds and impossible worlds\, gives us truth-relativizers for the purposes of explicating the truth conditions of many important kinds of sentences\, in particular\, counterfactual conditional sentences.\n(3) Ontological matters should be understood as matters pertaining to the domain of discourse associated with quantification.\n\nSupposition-Based Argument: “You assert P. Suppose you are right and P is true. Then Q follows. But Q is false. So\, P is false and you are not right”.\n\nClaim: Three insights + Supposition-Based Argument ⇨ a potentially endless sequence of ever-expanding ontological commitments.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/workshop-on-modality-with-or-without-possible-worlds/
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/A4556275-07D9-4476-8FD9-0CA973F36D36.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T173000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240603T100739Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240603T100818Z
UID:10019340-1717689600-1717695000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST x CEPPA - Sophie Grace Chappell 'Trans figured' book launch.
DESCRIPTION:Sophie Grace Chappell will present her new book Trans Figured: On Being a Transgender Person in a Cisgender World – followed by bubbles to celebrate!
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-x-ceppa-sophie-grace-chappell-trans-figured-book-launch/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/9781509561506.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240530
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240601
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20240226T142205Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250114T142551Z
UID:10018768-1717059600-1717145999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysical Explanation Workshop
DESCRIPTION:The University of St Andrews Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics and Epistemology will be hosting a workshop on Metaphysical Explanation.\n \nDescription: The purpose of the workshop is to bring together and promote research in the nature of metaphysical explanation\, exploring what it is and how it works. In addition\, the workshop seeks to explore the applications of metaphysical explanation to issues in metaphysics and related issues in analytic philosophy.\n \nSpeakers: Naomi Thompson (University of Bristol)\, Jessica Wilson (University of Toronto)\, Boris Kment (Princeton University)\, and Ross Cameron (University of Virginia).\n \nDATE AND VENUE: 30 May 2024\, Online on Teams.\n \nREGISTER HERE: https://forms.gle/JoSwMCx1edkzPW7N9\n \nPROVISIONAL SCHEDULE (Note: All times are in British Summer Time):\nEvery time slot includes: the main talk (45 mins)\, a commentary and reply (15 mins) and Q&A (15 mins).\n\n \n\n11:55 – 12:00 Preliminary Remarks \n12:00 – 13:15 Naomi Thompson: “Social Metaphysical Explanation”; Commentator: Jade Fletcher \n13:15 – 13:30 Break \n13:30 – 14:45 Boris Kment: “Ground and Paradox”; Commentator: Giulia Schirripa \n14:45 – 15:00 Break \n15:00 – 16:15 Ross Cameron: “Explanation and Plenitude in Non-Well-Founded Set Theories”; Commentator: Sabina Dominguez Parrado \n16:15 – 16:30 Break \n16:30 – 17:45 Jessica Wilson: “Metaphysical Skepticism\, Relativized Metaphysical Modality\, and Moderate Modal Naturalism”; Commentator: Luca Alberto Rappuoli \n\n\n \nTITLES AND ABSTRACTS\n\n \nTitle: Social Metaphysical Explanation (Naomi Thompson)\nAbstract: This paper argues that grounding and metaphysical explanation as they are ordinarily conceived are ill-suited to modelling the social world. Social facts are neither necessitated nor generated by their full grounds\, and there are good reasons to think of social metaphysical explanations as non-factive. Where grounding and metaphysical explanation are generally taken to form strict partial orders\, social metaphysical explanations are plausibly holistic. Social metaphysical explanation occurs in a context\, and it requires that in that context\, a social fact be represented as being determined on the basis of further facts\, and that concepts corresponding to social kinds featuring in the social fact to be explained are salient in that context\n\n \n\n\nTitle: Ground and Paradox (Boris Kment)\nAbstract: At the beginning of the 20th century\, Betrand Russell discovered a cluster of paradoxes that showed that certain initially very appealing principles of plenitude and individuation for sets\, properties\, and propositions are classically inconsistent. The search for a plausible\, unified\, and independently motivated solution has met with only limited success. I argue that recent ideas in the theory of grounding yield a new and promising approach. A ground-theoretic analysis of the Russellian paradoxes shows that they rest on assumptions that should be rejected because they violate a plausible non-circularity constraint on grounding. In some of the paradoxes\, the problematic assumption is a principle of plenitude. These paradoxes should be resolved by restrictions on our ontology. In the remaining paradoxes\, the assumption to be abandoned is an instance of the Law of Excluded Middle. The failure of Excluded Middle reflects the fact that reality is incomplete\, in the sense that some questions cannot be answered. We can settle such questions only by ruling out every possible answer.\n\n \n\n\nTitle: Explanation and Plenitude in Non-Well-Founded Set Theories (Ross Cameron)\nAbstract: Non-well-founded set theories allow set-theoretic exotica that standard ZFC will not allow\, such as a set that has itself as its sole member. We can distinguish plenitudinous non-well-founded set theories\, such as Boffa set theory\, that allow infinitely many such sets\, from restrictive theories\, such as Finsler-Aczel or AFA\, that allow exactly one. Plenitudinous non-well-founded set theories face a puzzle: nothing seems to explain the identity or distinctness of various of the sets they countenance. In this paper I aim to sharpen this puzzle\, make clear who it does and does not apply to and\, ultimately\, to argue in favor of a plenitudinous theory like Boffa.\n\n\n \n\nTitle: Metaphysical Skepticism\, Relativized Metaphysical Modality\, and Moderate Modal Naturalism (Jessica Wilson)\nAbstract: One route to skepticism about metaphysics (drawing on Rosen 2006\, Chalmers 2009\, Clarke-Doane 2019) proceeds by observing the following tension. On the one hand\, metaphysical claims are supposed to be metaphysically necessary; for example\, if Platonic universals are the metaphysical basis for resemblance between objects\, then this is supposed to be necessarily so. But on the other hand\, the operative modal epistemologies seem to offer support for the possibility of incompatible metaphysical claims; for example\, it seems conceivable both that Platonic universals might be the basis for resemblance between objects\, and also conceivable that tropes might be such a basis. Here I consider two strategies of response. The first—resistance—maintains that a better modal epistemology\, based in abduction (IBE) as opposed to conceiving and the like\, might justify one metaphysical claim over others (per Biggs and Wilson 2018\, 2020). The second strategy — accommodation — appeals to Relativized Metaphysical Modality\, or RMM (Murray and Wilson 2012; Hellie\, Murray\, and Wilson 2020)\, according to which what is possible or necessary may depend on facts about how the world actually is. RMM makes room for just one of a set of competing metaphysical claims to be true and hence metaphysically necessary\, while at the same time explaining intuitions that competing metaphysical claims are possible\, as reflecting (mere) speculative consideration of what would be possible or necessary against the backdrop assumption that a different world is actual. This strategy can be seen as expanding the application of Kripke’s notion of necessary a posteriori truths beyond the standard natural kind expressions to general metaphysical claims.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysical-explanation/
CATEGORIES:Workshops
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240520
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240523
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20231103T111724Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250114T142437Z
UID:10018751-1716195600-1716368399@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:The Epistemology of Inquiry
DESCRIPTION:The event is hybrid and open to philosophy faculty and students outside St Andrews. Remote participants can access the teams link by requesting it from Patrick Winther-Larsen (pjwl@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Jessica Brown (jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk). \nSpeakers: \nEndre Begby (Simon Fraser University)\nSanford Goldberg (Northwestern/St Andrews)\nJoshua Habgood-Coote (Leeds)\nChris Kelp (Glasgow)\nJulia Staffel (Colorado)\nElise Woodard (KCL\, London) \nProgramme: \nMay 20th:  \n11:30AM — 1PM: Sanford Goldberg; \n1PM — 2PM: Lunch; \n2PM — 3:30PM: Joshua Habgood-Coote; \n3:30PM — 4PM: afternoon coffee/tea plus biscuits; \n4PM — 5:30PM: Elise Woodard; \nDinner: 6:30 at Forgans \nMay 21st:  \n9:30AM — 11AM: Chris Kelp; \n11AM — 11:30AM: morning tea/coffee; \n11:30AM — 1PM: Julia Staffel; \n1PM — 2PM: lunch; \n2PM — 3:30PM: Endre Begby. \nAbstracts\nEndre Begby. Doxastic and zetetic norms: mutually dependent and equally fundamental \nThe recent resurgence of interest in the epistemology of inquiry has produced a discussion that is generally structured around the following types of questions: (i) granted that in addition to norms governing how we should form our beliefs in light of our evidence (“doxastic norms”) there also exist norms governing what we should do to provide ourselves with evidence in the first place (“zetetic norms”). But are these latter norms properly construed as epistemic norms\, as opposed to belonging to some broader category of prudential norms? (ii) If doxastic norms and zetetic norms are both epistemic norms\, which is more fundamental? Can we derive one set of norms from the other? Or (iii) should we be open to the possibility that they might be mutually irreducible and independent\, so that they might well generate incompatible obligations in context? \nIn this talk\, I offer some reasons to think that this dialectic is misguided. It is true that we sometimes criticize epistemic agents for the inferences they draw from the evidence currently at their disposal. Likewise\, it is true that we sometimes criticize them for their failure to gather more evidence\, where such evidence is there to be had. What doesn’t follow is that we are always (or even typically) invoking distinct norms in articulating these criticisms. \nTo support this claim\, I will present examples suggesting that in a large (and representative) range of cases — spanning science\, policy decisions\, and everyday life –\, what we should believe on our current evidence is importantly indeterminate: in order to settle which hypothesis our current evidence supports we require more evidence\, evidence which we could only gain by engaging in further inquiry. But on the other hand\, we could never know what sort of inquiry we thereby ought to engage in unless we also had a reasonably clear sense of what epistemic possibilities our current evidence leaves open and what it forecloses. I conclude that from the point of view of epistemic normativity\, the doxastic and zetetic perspectives are complementary\, mutually dependent\, and equally fundamental. \nSanford Goldberg. The norms of inquiry and the demands of conversation \nIn this paper I want to revisit Stalnaker’s (1978; 2002) Common Ground (CG) model as a way of thinking about inquiry.  While the CG is standardly used to model information updates in the course of (conversations about) inquiry\, my aim is to show how we can use the CG to model how the norms of inquiry bear on epistemic assessment.  I pursue this aim by developing several ideas regarding the CG.  Among these ideas I highlight the following: (1) there are types of conversation (Green 2017) which are such that participants are properly expected to presuppose certain things throughout the conversation (I call these the conversation’s “normative presuppositions”); (2) some inquiries are such that there is a corresponding conversation-type associated with them (throughout the period of inquiring); (3) for some social (or institutional) roles\, subjects who occupy these roles are properly expected to participate in certain conversations (including some associated with inquiries); (4) assertions made in the context of inquiry answer to an epistemic standard; and (5) assertions that contradict\, or are in tension with\, the conversation’s normative presuppositions are presumptively criticizable.  In this way\, I hope to show that there are types of inquiry for which the CG model enables us to capture our answerability to the norms of inquiry themselves and to the widely-accepted results thereby attained. \nJoshua Habgood-Coote. Bad Questions.  \nThis paper is about questions which are bad as questions\, in the sense that pursuing them will impede progress in inquiry. It seeks to do three things. First\, to gather examples of question critique: criticisms of views based not on their claims or arguments\, but the questions they ask. Second to give an account of the function of questions which sheds light on the varieties of bad question. And thirdly\, to provide us with a sound normative basis on which to undertake question critique.  \nChris Kelp. Inquiry and Epistemic Psychology \nThis paper proposes an account of epistemic psychological attitudes (such as belief\, credences\, suspension\, etc.) according to which they are types of moves in inquiry that have their own constitutive aims. I zoom in on belief and show how the account I developed in Inquiry\, Knowledge\, and Understanding can deal with a range of objections that have been raised in recent literature. The remainder of the paper takes a closer look at an alternative view of the relation between inquiry and epistemic psychology\, developed in recent work by Jane Friedman and provides reason to think that my account compares favourably with Friedman’s. \nJulia Staffel. Are there transitional beliefs? – I think so? \nA question that has gathered much interest in epistemology recently is whether it can ever be rational to keep inquiring into a question once one has adopted a belief that answers it. Friedman (2019) has prominently argued for a negative answer to this question. \nI am interested in a related\, but slightly different question here\, which has not gathered any attention\, but will help us better understand the nature of belief and its relation to inquiry and deliberation: Is it ever rationally permissible to believe something prior to concluding one’s deliberation? My question differs from the more commonly discussed one\, insofar as it asks about the rationality of believing that p before settling on p as the answer to some question Q\, while the commonly discussed one asks about the rationality of continuing to inquire into Q after coming to believe that p is the answer to Q. \nI will argue that it is possible for rational agents to hold beliefs of a certain kind\, which I call transitional beliefs\, prior to settling on an answer to a question. Further\, I will show that many common claims about what beliefs are don’t identify important features of belief itself\, but of attitudes that are held as conclusions of deliberations more generally. \nElise Woodard. How to Change Your Mind \nIf realists are more likely to become anti-realists than vice versa\, is that evidence that anti-realism is true? I argue that the answer is yes. When more people move from view A to B than B to A\, this is defeasible evidence that B is more likely correct than A. This idea\, which I refer to as “Migration as Evidence\,” suggests that widespread changes in belief could be meaningful indicators of truth. This approach has two main benefits. First\, it provides an additional tool for forming opinions on complex and controversial issues in areas like philosophy\, politics\, and religion\, where even experts disagree. Second\, it encourages a culture where changing one’s mind is more openly shared and less socially penalized\, fostering an environment where the pursuit of truth is prioritized over consistency. If correct\, “Migration as Evidence” highlights a valuable yet overlooked source of information when inquiring about complex and contentious issues. \n  \n 
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/the-epistemology-of-inquiry/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240411
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240414
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20231030T204346Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241009T130506Z
UID:10018750-1712826000-1712998799@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop: Proofs\, Rules\, and Meanings
DESCRIPTION:The workshop ‘Proofs\, Rules\, and Meanings’ is set to take place at the University of St Andrews (School V\, United College\, and livestreamed via Microsoft Teams) on 11 and 12 April 2024. It explores the relationship between proofs\, rules\, and meanings through the lens of proof-theoretic semantics. \n \nThis workshop features: \n\nthe contemporary logical and philosophical dimensions of proof-theoretic semantics;\nits historical roots and precursors; and\nits fruitful applications in philosophy\, linguistics\, computer science\, mathematics\, and beyond.\n\n\nRegistration \nThis is a hybrid workshop\, and there are no registration fees. Registration is now closed; if you would like to attend the workshop online\, please email proofs@st-andrews.ac.uk. \n\n\nAbstracts \nFor titles and abstracts\, see here. The schedule is below. \n\n\n\nSchedule  \n\n\nThursday\, 11th April 2024  \n09:30-10:00 – registration\, refreshments\, and welcome \n10:00-10:40 – “λμ: Relating Constructive\, Classical and Substructural Logics\,” Greg Restall (St Andrews) \n10:50-11:50 – “Meaning as Use\, Use as Meaning\,” Sophie Nagler (St Andrews/ILLC Amsterdam) \n11:55-12:35 – “Three Kinds of Logical Expressivism\,” Luca Incurvati (ILLC Amsterdam) \n12:35-13:35 – catered offline lunch (open to all attendees) \n\n\n13:40-14:40 – “Dummett\, Hacking\, and Circularity in Logical Semantics\,” Viviane Fairbank (St Andrews/Stirling) \n14:45-15:25 – “Speech Acts at the Dialogical Roots of Deduction\,” Catarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam/St Andrews) \n15:45-17:15 – “Logical Metainferentialism” (keynote)\, Bogdan Dicher (Witwatersrand) \n18:30-21:00 – conference dinner at The Bothy (speakers only) \n\n\n  \nFriday\, 12th April 2024 \nfrom 09:30 – refreshments \n10:00-10:40 – “Proof-Theoretic Validity Based on Elimination Rules\,” Peter Schroeder-Heister (Tübingen) \n10:50-11:50 – “Semantic Pollution and the Meaning of Connectives\,” Robin Martinot (Utrecht) \n11:55-12:35 – “‘Proof Theory’ in Medieval Logic\,” Sara Uckelman (Durham) \n12:35-13:35 – catered online lunch (open to all attendees) \n\n\n13:40-14:40 – optional walking tour of St Andrews \n14:45-15:25 – “An Ecumenical View of Proof-Theoretic Semantics\,” Elaine Pimentel (UCL) \n15:40-16:40 – “Bilateral Derivability: How to Implement (Constructive) Notions of Proof and Refutation in a Sequent Calculus\,” Sara Ayhan (Bochum) \n\n\n16:45-17:15 – plenary discussion: Proofs\, rules\, and meanings – quo vaditis? Chair: Stephen Read (St Andrews) \n18:00 – post-workshop drinks (open to all) \n\nAccessibility Information \nThe main venue (School V\, United College\, St Andrews) provides level access\, gender-neutral toilets and a hearing loop. For more information\, see the AccessAble guide and the room details page. The main door is access controlled\, and we will see to having volunteers open the door as needed. \nThere will be a breakout and coffee room\, dedicated as a quiet room\, across the corridor from the main venue. \n\nThe lunch room is the Stewart Room in Younger Hall. This is a two minute walk from the main venue and also has level access via an elevator. For more details\, see the AccessAble guide and the room details page. \nThe Teams call will be enabled for live captions. Online participant video will be visible to offline attendees at all times via an external monitor. \nWe are providing optional name badges\, on which people may also include their pronouns. \n\n\n\nStudent Travel Awards \nThe Association of Symbolic Logic (ASL) is offering (limited) student travel awards to attend this ASL-sponsored workshop. The ASL strongly encourages applications from women and members of minority groups. Applicants must be student members of the ASL. Applications must be received by 10th January 2024. For more details\, and to apply\, see: https://aslonline.org/meetings/student-travel-awards/. \nThe Analysis Trust is also offering (limited) student bursaries\, covering up to 50% of the full cost of accommodation and subsistence. Postgraduate students and under-employed recent postgraduates are eligable to apply. Travel costs are not covered by this bursary. Applications must be received by 10th February 2024\, and can be made as part of the general registration process. \n\nPartners \nThe workshop is organised in partnership with the St Andrews Metaphysics and Logic Research Group\, and the St Andrews Medieval Logic Research Group. It is funded by the Arché Research Centre\, the Scots Philosophical Association\, the British Logic Colloquium\, the Association for Symbolic Logic (ASL)\, and the Analysis Trust. \nThis event is affiliated with the PTS Network. Participants can join for updates on activities on Proof-Theoretic Semantics here. \n\nBackground \nProof-theoretic semantics is a research programme that aims to determine the meaning of linguistic expressions by analysing their inferential use. It was inspired by general proof theory\, the logical research programme that led to the development of the sequent calculus and natural deduction systems. Proof-theoretic semantics was subsequently given its name by Peter Schroeder-Heister (one of our speakers) in 1987. Since then\, it has become a vibrant research field in philosophical\, mathematical\, computational and linguistic logic. \n\nContact \nIf you have any questions\, get in touch via proofs@st-andrews.ac.uk.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/workshop-proofs-rules-and-meanings/
LOCATION:School V and via MS Teams\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group,Metaphysics and Logic group,Workshops
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231220T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231220T170000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20230913T133101Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231117T152939Z
UID:10018735-1703084400-1703091600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: NO SEMINAR
DESCRIPTION:Have a good break and see you in the new year!
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/metaphysics-and-logic-festive-seminar/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231214T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231214T143000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20230829T095301Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230907T141512Z
UID:10018708-1702558800-1702564200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/epistemology-seminar-6/2023-12-14/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231214T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231214T120000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20230829T094510Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230915T091550Z
UID:10018694-1702548000-1702555200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar: No Meeting
DESCRIPTION:We use the plenary seminar time slot on occasions when we have a meeting of wider interest to the whole Arché community.
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/plenary-seminar/2023-12-14/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231212T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231212T170000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20231211T132257Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231211T132258Z
UID:10018666-1702393200-1702400400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar - Emma Holmes (St Andrews & Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:This week will be a reading group on Gayle Rubin’s ‘Thinking sex’
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/fpst-seminar-11-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231212T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231212T140000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20231103T231604Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231103T231609Z
UID:10018652-1702382400-1702389600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Jack Shardlow (University of Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Motion(less) Pictures and Temporal Appearances \nAbstract: In this session I will present some work-in-progress which connects issues in the philosophy of mind\, concerning temporal appearances\, with the metaphysics of aesthetics\, while also incorporating some insights regarding our use of perceptual verbs. \nViewing typical moving images (i.e.\, animations/video recordings)\, we see what appears to be a variety of objects\, subjects\, and their various respective activities unfolding over time. Viewing a still image (i.e.\, paintings/photographs) we also see what appears to be a variety of objects and subjects\, and we see them as appearing to be engaged in various activities\, though we do not see what appears to be these activities unfolding over time. This should sound much like common sense. Yet\, the tenability of these claims depends on making explicit much that is only implicit. To make good sense of our experiential encounter with imagistic representations of activity\, we need to say more about our talk of ‘temporal appearances’\, and the comparisons and contrasts between the appearances presented by moving images and still images. Ultimately\, I argue that we should make room for two dissociable forms of temporal appearance: a dynamic pattern of appearance of ϕ-ing over time\, and the appearance of an object as an object that is ϕ-ing. \nOne further key aim in the talk is drawing the proper distinction between still and moving images. As noted by Danto (2006) and Walton (2008)\, moving images of static scenes can be visually indistinguishable from still images of the same scene; yet the two are experienced differently. I argue that this observation can be best explained\, with the two dissociable forms of temporal appearance\, if – unlike Danto and Walton – we take the differentia between still and moving images to simply be that the latter presents a duration\, while the former does not. While this might sound like common sense\, in making this case I dispute claims which notable authors have said to be ‘obvious’ (e.g.\, Carroll 2021).
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-jack-shardlow-university-of-edinburgh/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231211T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231211T110000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20230829T092626Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231105T211905Z
UID:10018734-1702287000-1702292400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Treatise on Consequences
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/medieval-logic-seminar-4-2/2023-12-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20231130
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20231203
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20231103T112422Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231209T164228Z
UID:10018752-1701334800-1701507599@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Neutrality and Neutralism Workshop
DESCRIPTION:Neutrality and Neutralism Workshop \nArché Research Centre\, University of St Andrews \nNovember 30th – December 1st 2023. \nVenue: School II\, United College\, St Salvator’s Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL \nSCHEDULE: \nDay One: \n9.15 – 10.45: Amie Thomasson: Deflationism as a path to Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering. \n11 – 12.30: Theron Pummer: Impartiality in Ethics. \n12.45 – 2.15: Jade Fletcher: Title tbc. \n14.30: Buffet Lunch for speakers and attendees. \n15.30 – 17.00: Patrick Greenough: From Minimalism to Neutralism. \n17.30: Workshop Reception (Edgecliffe) \n20.00-23.00: Workshop Dinner. \n  \nDay Two: \n9.15 – 10.45: Kristie Miller: Title tbc. \n11 – 12.30: Justin D’Ambrosio: Natural Language without Ontological Commitments. \n12.45 – 2.15: Luca Stroppa: Neutral Lives\, and How to Rank Them. \n14.30: Buffet Lunch for speakers and attendees. \n15.30 – 17.00: Josh Dever: On Saying the Same Thing (Without Saying the Same Things). \n17.30: After Workshop Gathering. \nSponsors: The Scots Philosophical Association and the Arché Research Centre
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/neutrality-and-neutralism-workshop/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, United College\, St Salvator's Quad\, St Andrews\, KY169AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231129T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231129T150000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20231127T101944Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231127T171805Z
UID:10018753-1701262800-1701270000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Starting a Step Back: The Relevance of Systemic Functional Linguistics to Metaphysics Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/starting-a-step-back-the-relevance-of-systemic-functional-linguistics-to-metaphysics-amie-thomasson-dartmouth/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, University of St Andrews\, St Andrews\, United Kingdom
GEO:56.3416934;-2.7927522
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230824
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230826
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20230425T101803Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231103T112902Z
UID:10018624-1692867600-1692953999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:2nd Scottish Epistemology Early Career Researchers (SEECRs) Pre-Read Workshop
DESCRIPTION:The Scottish Epistemology Early Career Researchers (SEECRs) group is holding a workshop for papers in any area of epistemology\, authored by postgraduate students and self-identified early career researchers based in\, or with research links to\, Scotland. \nThe workshop will take place at the University of St. Andrews on the 24th August 2023. \n  \nThe aim of the workshop is to share cutting-edge research and facilitate the exchange of ideas among early career epistemologists in Scotland\, as well as to provide early career epistemologists with detailed feedback on their work in a supportive and constructive environment. \nFive papers will be selected to be pre-read and discussed at the workshop with a group of other postgraduate students and early career researchers based in Scotland. Each paper will receive a response from a member of SEECRs who works on the same or a similar research topic. \nConference Venue: G03\, Edgecliffe\, St Andrews (coffee breaks and lunch in G01). \nFormat: In person. \nInfo: fja4@st-andrews.ac.uk. \nProgramme (Time Zone: GMT) \n10:30 – 11:00  Registration and Coffee\n11:00 – 12:00  Giada Fratantonio (Glasgow)—“Knowledge-first Evidentialism” \nRespondent: Fred Andersen (St Andrews) \n12:05 – 13:05  James Shearer (St Andrews)—“If You’re So Rational\, Why Don’t You Have Any Friends?” \nRespondent: Tim Kearl (Glasgow) \n13:05 – 14:05    Lunch \n14:05 -15:05  Oscar A. Piedrahita (Glasgow)—”In what sense is ignorance a failure” \nRespondent: Cian Brennan (Glasgow) \n15:10-16:10    Ísak Ólafsson (Glasgow)—”The Limits of Epistemic Gatekeeping” \nRespondent: Edoardo Cavasin (Aberdeen) \n16:10 – 16:30 Coffee Break \n16:30-17:30    ”Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews)—“Inductive Risk Decisions\, Jamesian Lockean thresholds\, and the Ethical Limits of Epistemic Permissivism” \nRespondent: Petronella Randell (St Andrews) \n18:30 Dinner (at the Adamson)
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/2nd-scottish-epistemology-early-career-researchers-seecrs-pre-read-workshop/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230706T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230706T120000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20230111T164225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230111T164225Z
UID:10018302-1688637600-1688644800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SS Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/ss-seminar/2023-07-06/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230705T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230705T180000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20230413T095053Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230413T104137Z
UID:10018623-1688572800-1688580000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/feminist-philosphy-and-social-theory-2/2023-07-05/
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230704T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230704T140000
DTSTAMP:20260602T204142
CREATED:20230628T094044Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230702T221216Z
UID:10018051-1688472000-1688479200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar : Mirko Prokop (University of the Basque Country) "The Sensorimotor Basis of Normative Attitudes"
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/arche/event/language-and-mind-seminar-11/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
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END:VCALENDAR