Abstract: Van Inwagen (1990) paraphrased sentences about macroscopic inanimate objects into sentences that mention only simples in order to show that the truth of these sentences do not ontologically commit us to the existence of composite inanimate objects. However, Uzquiano (2004) argued that either plural quantification over composites cannot be paraphrased as plural quantification over simples, or they can be paraphrased by quantifying additionally over regions of space. The second option is problematic because then a region of space can be identified with a macroscopic inanimate object. I will argue that what we can paraphrase and what we cannot paraphrase just reveal the limits of our linguistic abilities. Therefore, a paraphrase criterion for ontological commitments is too demanding. A better way to discover whether we are ontologically committed to certain entities is to use the truthmaker theory (Heil, 2003; Cameron, 2008). Following Cameron, I claim that there are things that exist fundamentally and other things that exist derivatively. We are ontologically committed only to the things that exist fundamentally. I will propose that Xs do not exist fundamentally, but they exist derivatively, if we can describe, without mentioning the Xs as entities that exist fundamentally, the conditions under which it is correct to use specific sentences about Xs.These descriptions are made by referring only to simples, their properties, space-time points, and by presenting how predicates and sentences are satisfied by them. I believe that my view should be preferred as it does not face the problems that the paraphrasis view does. Those conditions can be given for the sentences presented by Uzquiano (2004). They do not claim that regions of space-time exist fundamentally. Therefore, there is not something that exists fundamentally and can be identified with macroscopic objects.