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Fallibilism and Evidence
Research Project: Evidence, Justification and Knowledge
23rd June 2014 - 24th June 2014
Confirmed speakers include: Jessica Brown (St Andrews), Juan Comesana (Arizona), Daniel Greco (Yale), Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (Michigan), Matthew McGrath (Missouri), L A Paul (UNC Chapel Hill), Baron Reed (Northwestern), Jonathan Vogel (Amherst)
Traditionally, most non-sceptics have endorsed fallibilism about knowledge according to which one can know that p on the basis of evidence which doesn’t entail that p, or guarantee that p. Fallibilism seems to accord with the intuitive idea that there is often a gap between our evidence and what is known on the basis of that evidence. However, recently there has been renewed interest in defending non-sceptical infallibilist views of knowledge. One way to close the apparent gap between evidence and knowledge is to enrich our understanding of evidence. Strategies for doing so include disjunctivism and Williamson’s idea that all knowledge is evidence. An alternative way to close the apparent gap between evidence and knowledge is to weaken our understanding of what it takes for evidence to guarantee or entail that p. Contextualist theories of knowledge offer the possibility of a contextual weakening of what it takes for evidence to “guarantee” or “entail” a proposition. This workshop examines a number of questions arising from this recent interest in infallibilism including:
What is one’s evidence? Is there a gap between one’s evidence and what is known on that basis?
How should we define fallibilism and infallibilism?
What problems face recent versions of infallibilism, including Williamson’s probability 1 version? Can infallibilism accommodate major kinds of knowledge including testimony, memory, perception, induction, and inference to the best explanation?
How can fallibilism avoid some of the main problems for the view, including problems arising from closure, bootstrapping, concessive knowledge attributions, the threshold problem, and the relation between knowledge and action?
Monday, June 23
10:00-11:30. Jessica Brown Prospects for infallibilism
11:30-11:45. Short break
11:45-13:15.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio Fallible Evidence and Enkratic Requirements: A Paradox
14:15-15:45 Daniel Greco How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1
16:15-17:45. Juan Comesana Against the New Infallibilists
19:00 Workshop dinner at the Russell Hotel, on The Scores
Tuesday, June 24
10:00-11:30 Mathew McGrath Knowing What Things Look Like
11:45-13:15 Baron Reed Moorean Handwaving: When Knowledge Isn’t Enough
14:15-15:45 Jonathan Vogel Misleading Evidence
16:00-17:30 L A Paul Transformative Experience
Organisers of the workshop are Professors Jessica Brown and Matthew McGrath.
For more information about this event, please send an email to the workshop organisers at email@example.com
Other events in Evidence, Justification and Knowledge
Jun 2015: St Andrews Normative Reasons Workshop