Kerensky in 1917 by John Freedlund Alexander Kerensky was the only member of the Provisional Government’s first cabinet to also have a position within the Soviet, and was therefore in a unique position to mediate between the socialist and liberal divide of Dual Power. He was not, however, a committed Social Democrat or Social Revolutionary; in the words of an acquaintance, Kerensky seemed more ‘a nonparty individualist’ who ‘on the borderline between the socialist and bourgeois democracy.’[1] Soon after Kerensky’s assumption of the Provisional Government leadership in July, this unique brand of mixed allegiances proved to be his and the liberal movement’s undoing. Kerensky’s first major mistake was the adoption of a strongly pro-war position, trading the possibility of an immediate, separate peace for the chance at keeping good faith with the Allies and securing Russian rights to strategic ports and territories. While the Soviet made (unsuccessful) overtures to the Allies’ pacifist elements, the Government took an alienating martial tone directly to the front, with the “Persuader-in-Chief’ Kerensky ‘summon[ing them] not to a feast, but to death.’[2] Combining this powerful, polarizing oratory with disastrous military policy against Germany in June, then-War Minister Kerensky damaged his standing among the members of the Socialist Left in favour of the military. Showing an aptness for contradictory policy-making however, Kerensky did nothing in the face of the Petrograd Soviet’s ‘Order No. 1’ of March 1st, which allowed the formation of soldier’s committees at the front line, undermining the authority of the very officers who were meant to bring success to the June Offensive. The disintegration of Russian troop morale along this southwestern front should not surprise anybody who has examined the two-faced nature of Kerensky’s leadership. The ambiguous relationship the now Minister-President (as of July) cultivated with the military led directly to the second fiasco of Kerensky’s summer: the Kornilov Affair. Kerensky’s appointment of General Kornilov as supreme commander of the armed forces on July 18th seemed to be in line with the Government’s desire to streamline and discipline the army at war. Kornilov’s abortive march on Petrograd in August, however, was quickly squashed by the same Kerensky who had initially supported the general’s militaristic intentions for factory workers and soldier-officer relations. The ‘insoluble ambiguity’ of the Government’s position on the army led to the immediate resignation of Kornilov’s successor Alexeyev, who offered only the statement, ‘We have no army’.[3] The demoralisation of the Russian military led directly to action by the Soviet, which created the Military Revolutionary Committee to guard against future Kornilovs or the ever-nearer German Army. The formation of a five-man ‘Directory’ on the first of September, headed by Kerensky, was not enough to stop the initiative passing to the resurgent Bolshevik Party, who by now operated from the Soviet and behind the MRC. Kerensky’s leadership led directly to this outcome: his War Ministry had whipped up an offensive while devaluing the worth of officers and his presidency’s mixed policies had invited violent unrest which siphoned power away from the Provisional Government and towards the party of Lenin. The meagre support offered to Kerensky in the days following his toppling on the 25 of October (some 700 soldiers) is valid evidence for his unpopularity and ineffectiveness at the very end. * As an additional point, Kerensky’s personal style of leadership may have alienated those who would rather have emphasized the ‘Provisional’ in ‘Provisional Government’ and seen Kerensky act less officiously and authoritatively (i.e. the PG’s dealings with Ukrainian nationalists) before the convening of the Constituent Assembly. Notes
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