PY 4818, Global Justice: War

 

Traditional Just War Theory

Jus ad Bellum:

1)    It must have a just cause. 

2)    It must be waged by a legitimate authority.

3)    The motive in waging the war must be right.

4)    It must be a last resort.

5)    There must be a reasonable chance of success.

Jus in Bello:

6)    Discrimination – the innocent (i.e. non-combatant civilians) must not be targeted. 

7)    Proportionality – the costs incurred by the war are not disproportionate in comparison with the wrongs that justify waging he war or the evils that justify military action. 

Condition 1:

   This has traditionally focused on taken to mean that war must be a defence of oneπs own or  

   another state against unjust aggression.  

   Cosmopolitan claims:

   1) There is no automatic right to state sovereignty.  The right to wage war in self-defence is  

   limited to legitimate states.  Their legitimacy is dependent on whether they respect the interests

   and rights of their citizens.

            (Individuals alone are the fundamental units of moral concern.)

   2) It may be morally required to protect another state against unjust aggression, or to    

   intervene in a foreign state, by force if necessary, to prevent human rights violations. 

Condition 2:

 Cosmopolitans stress that the just authority need not be a state.  It might be an international body

  such as the United Nations.

Condition 6:

   It may be permissible to kill enemy soldiers in self-defence, or in defence of othersπ lives

   against aggressive attack.  It is absolutely prohibited, however, to target civilians.

            ≥Innocent≤ here most plausibly means ≥not harming≤, as opposed to ≥not guilty≤;

   Consequentialist versions of cosmopolitanism will question the view that there is a fundamental 

   moral distinction between intended and foreseen civilian casualties.  

Condition 7:

   The costs incurred by the war must not be disproportionate to the evil the war would prevent.

   This requires summing up the costs of war. According to ambitious cosmopolitanism, we  

   should treat all casualties as on a par.  All persons – enemy and fellow citizen – enjoy equal

   moral weight. 

   Conditions 6 and 7 are part of The Doctrine of Double Effect: The morally unacceptable effects

   of an action should not have been intended either as an end or as a means to an intended end,

   and they should be strictly limited.  

an expression of the idea that the justifiability of war is based on the right of

   individuals to defend their own lives.  A stateπs waging war is morally defensible when it

   amounts to the exercise by its individual members of their right of self-defence.

Condition (2) says that the decision to go to war must properly represent the views of the people

   on whose behalf the war is being waged.

Condition (3) prohibits wars which use self-defence as a cloak for pursuing other ends.

Conditions (4) and (5) reflect what we say about the right of an individual to kill in self-defence.

According to (6), it is wrong to intentionally kill civilians, though it may be permissible to

   perform self-defensive actions that foreseeably lead to civilian casualties.  This relies on the

   doctrine of double effect, according to which there is an important moral distinction between

   foreseen and intended consequences. 

According to (7), the minimum necessary force must be used, and it must be proportionate to the

   threat.  This, again, reflects what we say about the right of an individual to kill in self-defence. 

The Consequentialist Theory of Just War

  Just ad Bellum:

    A war is just if it is the only way of averting consequences that are even worse. 

  Jus in Bello:

    The just means of waging a war are whatever minimise the overall number of casualties and     

        the overall amount of suffering on both sides. 

Some Consequentialist objections to traditional just war theory:

  Versus (1):

    It is too narrow.  It may be right to go to war to protect civilians from serious rights violations

       (such as genocide) at the hands of their own government. 

 Versus (6):

     i.  This constraint is too strong.  It gives insufficient weight to the deaths that could result from

            such an absolute ban.

     ii. There is no morally relevant distinction between foreseen and intended deaths.  We

            should take full responsibility for both.