University of St Andrews
PY 4826: Life and Death (2005)
Description:
How should we think about moral problems concerning life and death? Choices about whose life to save and whom to allow to die do have to be made, in the health service and elsewhere. Some actions which aim at good ends will endanger lives. Furthermore, decisions taken now will affect who is alive in the future. How should we think about decisions such as these? This module is not a 'moral problems' course: it does not concentrate of particular kinds of killing or letting die (abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment etc) with a view to spelling out the circumstances in which they are right or wrong. Instead, it deals with the following general questions concerning life and death. Is death bad? In virtue of what is life good? Is there a morally significant difference between killing and letting die, or between intending someone's death and merely foreseeing it? On what principles would one choose between lives, when the choice is forced? How should future lives be taken into account in present decisions?
Lecture Hour: Tuesday, 11am, School V
Lecturer: Elizabeth Ashford (ea10@st-and.ac.uk)
Office Hours: Tuesdays 4 to 6 pm (room 201).
Teaching: One lecture per week and five seminars per semester (weeks 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11).
Assessment: Continuous assessment = 40%, 2 hour examination = 60%
Marking will be in accordance with the University marking system:
17-20 First Class 8-10 Third
14-16 Upper Second 5-7 Pass
11-13 Lower Second 1-4 Fail – no credit awarded
Topic 1 Is Death a Harm?
Preparatory reading: Nagel, “Death”
Topic 2 The Value of Life
Preparatory reading: Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1984), Appendix 1.
Topic 3 Killing versus Letting Die
Preparatory reading: Bennett, “Whatever the Consequences”, and Trammel, “Saving Life and Taking Life”.
Topic 4 The Doctrine of Double Effect
Preparatory reading: Kagan, The Limits of Morality, Ch. 4, and Quinn, “Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect”.
Topic 5 Future Generations
Preparatory reading: Gregory Kavka, “The Paradox of Future Individuals”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982).
Topic 6 Do the Numbers Count?
Preparatory reading: Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?”
Topic 7 Choosing Between People
Preparatory reading: Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol 1, Ch. 11.
There will be four seminars each in groups of 6, weeks 3, 7, 10 and 12. Preparatory reading for each seminar is essential. The goal of these sessions is to assist in understanding the lectures and the reading, and to discuss, examine and develop your own views on the topics. Please come prepared with your opinions about the topic, problems and questions.
Week 3 Is death a harm, and if so, how?
Week 5 Is there a convincing account of what makes life good?
Week 7 Is the distinction between killing and letting die in itself morally significant?
Week 9 What moral importance should we attach to the effects that our present actions will have on (a) the number and (b) the quality of the lives that will exist in the future?
Week 11 If you face a choice between saving the lives of different groups of people,
on what principles should you make the decision?
Readings under each heading are listed in the order in which it is recommended that you read them, generally in order of difficulty.
A photocopy of the first item of reading for each week will be available in the course folder, in the Class Library.
Topic 1: Is Death a Harm?
Thomas Nagel, “Death”, Nous 4 (1970), repr. In his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: CUP, 1979), pp. 1-10.
Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus”.
Bernard Williams, “The Makropoulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality”, in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: CUP, 1973), pp. 82-100.
F. M. Kamm, Morality, Morality, Vol. 1 (New York: OUP, 1993), Ch. 1.
James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: OUP, 1986), Ch. 4
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1984), Appendix 1.
Griffin, Well-Being, Chs 1-3.
Andrew Moore, “Objective Human Goods”, in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker (eds), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 75-89.
Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics (Boulder: Westview, 1998), section 2.2.
Against treating the distinction as morally significant:
Jonathan Bennett, “Whatever the Consequences”, Analysis 26 (1965-6), pp. 83-102.
Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: OUP, 1989), Ch. 3.
Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: OUP, 1995)
In favour of treating the distinction as morally significant:
Richard Trammel, “Saving Life and Taking Life”, Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), pp. 131-137.
Jeff McMahn, “Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid”, Ethics 103 (1993), pp. 250-79.
F.M. Kamm, “Killing and Letting Die: Methodological and Substantive Issues”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983), pp. 297-312.
F.M. Kamm: “Nonconsequentialism”, in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), Ch. 11.
Against the Doctrine of Double Effect:
Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality, Ch. 4.
Kagan, Normative Ethics, section 3.5.
Jonathan Bennett, “Morality and Consequences”, in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 2 (1981).
For the Doctrine of Double Effect:
Warren Quinn, “Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989), pp. 334-51.
Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect”, in her Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), pp. 19-32.
Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: OUP, 1986), Ch. 9.
F. M. Kamm, “Harming Some to Save Others” , Philosophical Studies 57 (1989), pp. 227-60.
A. Is being created a benefit?
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1984), Ch. 16.
Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol 1 (New York: OUP, 1993), Ch. 2.
Gregory Kavka, “The Paradox of Future Individuals”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982).
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1984), Ch. 17.
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1984), Chs 18 and 19.
Jeff McMahn, “Problems of Population Theory”, Ethics 92 (1981).
Jan Narveson, “Utilitarianism and the New Generation”, Mind 76 (1967), pp. 62-72.
John Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1977), pp. 293-316.
Derek Parfit, “Innumerate Ethics”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978), pp. 285-301.
F. M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol. 1, Chs 5 and 6.
F. M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol 1, Ch. 11
Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977), Ch. 17.
F. M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality Vol 1, Chs 12 – 15.
The continuous assessment component of this course comprises one essay, which contributes 40% of the overall mark for the module.
Requests for extensions must be submitted in writing in advance.
Deadline: Thursday 14th April (week 8), 5pm.
Word Length: 2500 words maximum. Please do not exceed the word limit, and please write the word count on the front of your essays.
Questions: Either: “Is death a harm, and if so, how?”
Or: “Is there an intrinsic moral distinction between killing and letting die?”
A two-hour examination – requiring two questions to be answered – contributes the
remaining 60% of the overall mark for the module.