PY3102 Handout 8: Constructivism:
A view is a moral constructivist position if
a) It says the truth (or reasonableness, or validity) of a moral claims of kind K depends on whether we would (or could) reach that claim through an appropriate procedure of construction. A procedure of construction is one that begins with some material M which does not logically imply K, and a set of rules that take us from M to K. For Rawls, K are claims about the principles of justice that are reasonable to accept.
b) The material from which K is constructed includes the agreement or endorsement of the relevantly affected agents (or their representatives). In the case of Rawls, these are the representatives of the citizens who will have to live under the principles of justice.
Note that one can be a local or a global constructivist. A local constructivist just gives a constructivist account for some moral claims. A global constructivist gives one for all of them. Also note that someone can be a constructivist about the reasonableness of a claim (Rawls) without taking a stand on whether those claims are true. The natural competitor to moral realism is global moral constructivism about the truth of moral claims. Still, even a local constructivist who is concerned with truth takes a stand against a realist interpretation of some moral claims.
Rawls: But what about the constructivist about the reasonableness of claims? Rawls is the prime exponent of this kind of view. He sees his view as an odd sort of competitor to realist views about the moral truth and how to reach it. It’s a competitor for two reasons. First, for Rawls the concern of ethics is not to discover truths that we could come to know as we come to know empirical facts, but to guide our actions in a reasonable manner. Though this approach is compatible with views like realism, it suggests they are unnecessary and that they have a misguided attitude towards ethics. The focus of ethics should be on the reasonable and not the true. Second, since the Original Position models our view of ourselves as free and equal moral persons, and it is plausible to see facts about justice as deriving from these, we should reject realism’s concern with facts about justice that are supposed to exist independently of the kinds of people we want to be.
Rawls’ Account: The principles of justice it is reasonable to accept are those that would be chosen (constructed) from behind the veil of ignorance in the OP.
Scanlon’s Account: An act is morally wrong iff its performance under the relevant circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no one could reasonable reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.
Habermas’ Account: A norm is valid iff all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests. (validity is to norms as truth is to empirical claims)
He is driven to it primarily through concern that his account of justice be supported from as many moral viewpoints as possible. So, he doesn’t want to rule out the truth of any of these viewpoints. Instead, he wants to show that they all should accept the principles of justice as reasonable. This doesn’t commit him to any view about their truth, which might step on the toes of some people’s moral views. He is attracted to the view on independent ground, though. He believes that