CRIEFF Discussion Paper Number 0607

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Less fighting than expected — experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions

Oliver Kirchkamp

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Abstract
The paper compares with the help of experiments dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. While most experimental studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions, we find underbidding in a similar institution, the war of attrition, in particular if the bidding process is dynamic.

We study bids and revenue in different experimental frames and matching procedures and draw a link to the literature on stepwise linear bidding functions.

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JEL Classifications
C72, C92, D44, E62, H30

Keywords
War of attrition, dynamic bidding, all-pay auction, stabilisation, volunteer’s dilemma, experiment

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