CRIEFF Discussion Paper Number 0512
Gender
Discrimination and Efficiency in Marriage: the Bargaining Family under Scrutiny
Helmut Rainer (University of St. Andrews)
Abstract
This paper criticizes the view that discrimination
limits the disadvantaged sex to undertaking housework and thus ensures that
gains from specialization at the household level are not wasted. Our framework
gives attention to causal links between labor market discrimination and the
strategic behavior of women and men within families. We consider a repeated
family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households. A
key aspect of the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously:
the amount of money a person earns—in comparison with a partner’s
income—establishes relative marital bargaining power. Gender discrimination can
alter household behavior in surprising and sometimes unfortunate ways. We show
that: (i) the efficiency of household decisions is
sometimes inversely related to the prevailing degree of gender discrimination
in labor markets; (ii) discriminated against females have difficulty enforcing
cooperative household outcomes since they may be extremely limited to credibly
punish opportunistic behavior by their male partners; (iii) the likelihood that
sharing rules such as “equal sharing” are maintained throughout a marriage
relationship is highest when men and women face equal opportunities in labor
markets. A key policy implication obtained from our analysis is that efforts to
promote greater gender equality in labor markets can also contribute to
increasing the likelihood of fully cooperative outcomes at the household level.
JEL Classifications
D13; J71; J82; C78.
Keywords
Gender Roles, Discrimination, Marital Negotiations, Reputation.
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