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Models, Modality and Meaning
 
 
 
 


Forthcoming Events

10-11 June 2013: Necessity, Analyticity and the Apriori

11-13 October 2013: Meaning: Models and Proofs

Models, Modality and Meaning

Project leader: Stephen Read
Co-Investigators: Aaron Cotnoir, Ephraim Glick, Graham Priest, Stewart Shapiro, Derek Ball
Project Doctoral Students: Laura Celani, Noah Friedman-Biglin, Bruno Jacinto, Spencer Johnston, Alex Yates

In this project, we examine the connections between semantic modelling, possible worlds semantics and the nature of meaning.
Questions which the project will examine include the following:

  • What is the connection between model theory and an adequate account of meaning?
  • Are proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics complementary in giving an account of meaning, or does one have priority over the other?
  • What are the formal connections between the notions of logical necessity, metaphysical necessity, analyticity and aprioricity?
  • Two-dimensional theories of meaning posit two different dimensions of meaning. What can be learned about the nature of logic from these theories? For instance, is logic relative to a dimension of meaning?
  • What is the connection between model theory and an adequate account of validity?
  • Is there a single notion of logical consequence (or validity)?  If so, how do we determine what it is?  If there is more than one, what are the differences?
  • To what extent and how is logical consequence normative for reasoning?
  • What is the connection between models and truth conditions?
  • Modal logic standardly deploys a notion of possible world. Is the notion of an impossible world similarly useful?
  • What can be learned about the nature of logic from an examination of the history of modal logic?
  • To solve the semantic paradoxes, Bradwardine proposed that meaning is closed under some notion of consequence. For what notions of consequence, if any, is this true? Can this phenomenon be modelled?
  • How do the logics of metaphysical necessity and context-sensitivity interact? Can their interaction shed light into other debates, such as that between the necessitist and the contingentist?

In November 2012, the project hosted a workshop on Modal Logic in the Middle Ages. For further details, see the workshop page