University of St Andrews AHCR web site CSMN web site
 
 
Models, Modality and Meaning
 
 
 

Previous Events
16-17 May 2015 Wyclif and the Realist Tradition in 14th-Century Logic
11-12 Oct 2014 Non-Alethic Aims of Enquiry
19-20 June 2014 Philosophy of Logic
5-6 June 2014: Tense in Semantics and Philosophy of Language
12-14 May 2014: Medieval Logic & Metaphysics
16 November 2013: Formal Metaphysics Workshop
11-13 October 2013: Meaning: Models and Proofs
10-11 June 2013: Necessity, Analyticity and the Apriori
22-23 November 2012: Modal Logic in the Middle Ages

Models, Modality and Meaning

Project leader: Stephen Read
Co-Investigators: Derek Ball, Aaron Cotnoir, Ephraim Glick, Mark Thakkar
Project Doctoral Students: Laura Celani, Ryo Ito, Bruno Jacinto, Spencer Johnston, Hasen Khudairi, Poppy Mankowitz, Fenner Tanswell, Alex Yates

In this project, we examined the connections between semantic modelling, possible worlds semantics and the nature of logic and meaning. Questions which the project examined include the following:

  • Are proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics complementary in giving an account of meaning, or does one have priority over the other?
  • What are the formal connections between the notions of logical necessity, metaphysical necessity, analyticity and aprioricity?
  • Two-dimensional theories of meaning posit two different dimensions of meaning. What can be learned about the nature of logic from these theories ? For instance, is logic relative to a dimension of meaning?
  • To what extent and how is logical consequence normative for reasoning?
  • Modal logic standardly deploys a notion of possible world. Is the notion of an impossible world similarly useful?
  • What can be learned about the nature of logic from an examination of the history of the notion of logic consequence?
  • To solve the semantic paradoxes, Bradwardine proposed that meaning is closed under some notion of consequence. For what notions of consequence, if any, is this true?
    Can this phenomenon be modelled?
  • How do the logics of metaphysical necessity and context-sensitivity interact? Can their interaction shed light into other debates , such as that between the necessitist and the contingentist?